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Promoting Professionalism in Military Intelligence



Soviet Threat Issue

From the Commander



by Brig. Gen. Sidney T. Weinstein

In keeping with the tradition established by former commanders of the United States Army Intelligence Center and School, I will take this opportunity to share some thoughts with you on what major challenges face Military Intelligence today and in the future.

As borne out in the recent Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System Program Review held here at USAICS, we are at a crucial crossroad in determining how the intelligence business will be conducted in the future. New systems, new doctrine and new concepts will be coming into the intelligence world at an unprecedented rate in the next few years. The challenge that this period of change represents to USAICS is monumental. It demands that MI officers, warrant officers and noncommissioned officers, whose skill and experience can help chart the course through this period of change,

recognize USAICS as the focal point for determining what the future will bring. If USAICS is to be the center of excellence of the MI community, talent and experience must reside at Fort Huachuca, Fort Devens, and the Goodfellow and Pensacola Detachments of USAISD. These four locations comprise the home of Military Intelligence, where our training, training developments and combat developments actually occur. I encourage all who read this to seek an assignment within the home of Military Intelligence and to lend your energies to the important and demanding tasks that face us.

Everyone in Military Intelligence can become a partner in the process of change and growth if each of us makes a renewed commitment to professional excellence. In part, that means solving problems wherever they exist and surfacing constructive ideas on

any of the host of problems we are all familiar with. One of the simplest ways to solve some of the nagging problems out there is to know your job and understand the capabilities and limitations of your assets. Broad vision and a clear understanding of the role of Military Intelligence in the total Army, whether at battalion level or at the echelon above corps, is an absolute prerequisite to professional excellence. That kind of insight changes attitudes and modifies perceptions as to what the problems in our profession really are.

Setting the course for the future also means fully accepting and working within the complete range of our responsibilities. Inventory what is known and seek out what is not known. It is easy to stay on the periphery and criticize, but in doing so we are contributing to the problem rather than its solution. My years in MI have convinced me that we, as a branch, have the brightest, most innovative men and women in the Army. If that is the truth—and I believe it to be—the potential which can be tapped is enormous. We ourselves are the key to the future. We can unlock the future by adopting a philosophy of contributing, not merely criticizing.

You all know the address of the Military Intelligence Center and School. Come up on the net. Accept the challenge of problem solving. Make the MI profession of tomorrow better today by contributing.

As the commander of USAICS, the home of our branch, my commitment to all of you will be excellence and professionalism.

Military Intelligence

ACSI Viewpoint

Soviet use of unconventional warfare

Information contained in this article has been drawn from a variety of open sources and was edited by the Foreign Intelligence Directorate, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence:

Current discussions of possible future conflicts often focus on nuclear weapons and conventional forces, but an important third element, unconventional warfare, should be addressed with equal concern.

The Soviets define unconventional warfare as a variety of military and paramilitary operations, including partisan warfare, subversion and sabotage (conducted during peace and war), and other covert or clandestine special operations. Soviet unconventional warfare activities are managed at the highest level of government authority. The Committee for State Security (KGB) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff probably plan and execute Soviet unconventional warfare operations. These activities are protected by stringent security measures.

The Soviet leadership has a variety of elite forces, believed to number in the tens of thousands, for conducting unconventional warfare missions. Special units of the KGB, GRU, airborne, ground and naval forces are all referred to as SPETSNAZ, a Russian contraction for "special purpose." The KGB special purpose units have a sabotage mission and are thought to be targeted primarily against the civilian sector. Their tasks would be to create general panic among the civilian population, disrupt civil government and public utilities,

and damage or destroy key production facilities.

SPETSNAZ of the regular Soviet armed forces include elite airborne units, special sabotage/reconnaissance units and special long-range reconnaissance units. The most powerful and numerous of these are the airborne troops, who perform SPETSNAZ missions under the direct control of the GRU in Moscow. These units are trained for small group operations against key political, military, command and control, transportation and industrial targets in the enemy rear area.

Soviet unconventional warfare missions can be divided into three categories: strategic, operational and tactical. The principal differences in the missions are the level of command controlling an operation and the nature of the targets engaged. The overall objectives are similar—to weaken military capabilities of the target country and to facilitate follow-on conventional operations.

Strategic unconventional warfare missions, conducted in the heartland of the enemy, would be aimed at reducing the enemy's ability to continue the war. These missions would include efforts to intimidate and demoralize the populace, create chaos and disrupt public services, and undermine national resistance. Strategic unconventional warfare missions would also be performed by select regular airborne

forces. Small elite airborne teams would operate at great depths behind enemy lines. Their basic objectives would be to weaken enemy operational readiness and combat effectiveness. Their mission would include neutralization of major enemy headquarters, destruction of enemy nuclear weapons and sabotage to support disruption of enemy communications and key logistics facilities.

Operational unconventional warfare missions in support of the front and subordinate field armies are carried out under the control of the front commander. Airborne forces, special GRU SPETSNAZ units and army sabotage/reconnaissance units would perform these missions. Their primary objective would be to destroy or neutralize enemy nuclear means within the front's area of operation to a depth of 350-1,000 kilometers. Additional missions include preparation/security of landing sites for regular airborne forces; sabotage operations against airfields, railway lines, road and rail bridges, and communications systems; and terrorist acts against the civilian population.

Tactical unconventional warfare missions are conducted in support of division-sized units and are similar to the operational missions described above but are on a smaller scale and in less depth. The Soviet divisional reconnaissance battalion also has a limited capability to per-

Soviet Airborne: The Quiet Revolution

by SFC Peter L. Bunce

"In ground operations it is certain that at thrust-points armoured and airborne forces would be coordinated—both being highly mobile troops, and the airborne forces able to overleap the enemy lines. The Russians have already made up their minds that, in breaking through an opposing front, airborne troops will play the leading part in the rear of the enemy."¹

The words above were written in 1956 by Colonel General Kurt Student, the founding father of Germany's airborne forces, and are as true today as they were then. The Soviet Union possesses an airborne force larger than any other in the world, possessing great strategic and tactical mobility, and more fire-power per unit than any other airborne or airmobile force in the world.

Background

The first known use of airborne forces by the Soviets was in 1930, when a parachute-dropped platoon captured an opposing corps headquarters in maneuvers near Moscow. By 1936, the Soviets were able to stun Western military observers by parachuting 1,200 troops and air-landing another 5,000 in a single operation in well-

publicized maneuvers in the Ukraine.² In contrast, 1936 was the year before the first German parachute battalion was formed.³ The first American parachute unit, the 501st Parachute Battalion, was not raised until September 1940.⁴ At the beginning of World War II, the Soviet airborne force, some 12 brigades totalling about 30,000 men, was unrivaled in the world.

Soviet use of airborne forces in "The Great Patriotic War" was disappointing. The original 12 trained brigades were used as ordinary infantry in the attempt to stem the German invasion of 1941.⁵ After the Eastern front was stabilized in the winter of


1941-42, the only operations the Soviets were capable of mounting were small, partisan or commando-like drops of less than 100 troops. The only airborne operation of any size took place on the Dnieper on 24 September 1943. The 1st, 3rd, and 5th Guards Parachute Brigades jumped at dusk in the midst of the German 19th Panzer and 10th Panzergrenadier Divisions. It was an ill-timed, badly planned operation executed with poorly trained and

equipped troops hurriedly gathered from seven different units. The three brigades were eliminated by daybreak; a handful of men made their way out to join partisan groups.⁶

Despite this negative experience, the Soviets rebuilt their



BMD Airdrop. Equipment dropped by retro-rocket parachute system.




airborne forces after the war until, in 1956, Student was able to write: "Western intelligence services identified seven divisions. Three other divisions were in process of formation and should be ready by now." Besides their tactical threat, quoted above, Student saw in this immense force the possibilities for strategic feats accomplis: "What are the possible objectives of Russian airborne operations? An obvious one is Alaska, the 'open door of the American continent.' This territory presents itself to the Russian airborne troops as an ideal objective. The U.S.A. would also be well advised to protect especially their



advanced bases, and atomic bases, around the Eastern hemisphere—above all those situated in remote places."⁷

Today, the Soviet airborne force—Vozdushno Desantnyye Voyska—stands at eight divisions of approximately 8,500 officers and men each. As illustrated, all are Category I units, the highest level of readiness in the Soviet military, with only the possible exception of the 106th Guards Airborne Division, which also

serves as the training base for the VDV. Training levels and standards are high. All recruits must complete preinduction training, a feat matched only in the strategic rocket forces. Approximately half of the recruits have parachute training prior to induction. New airborne troopers are jump trained at the Tula-Ryazan Airborne Complex by the 106th Guards Airborne Division before



they join their units. With their regiments, the Soviet airborne troopers will jump a minimum of 10 times a year to maintain readiness.* Airborne regiments are regularly dropped in Soviet multi-division exercises.

The Soviets have shown a readiness to use their airborne divisions in crisis situations when reliable, highly mobile troops are required. The 103rd Guards Airborne Division seized the Prague airport in the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Several divisions, including the 103rd, were alleged to be on full alert during the 1973 Middle East War. The 105th Guards Airborne Division spearheaded the Soviet forces that took over Kabul in 1979. The 105th remains in Afghanistan today, apparently joined by one or more regiments of the 103rd.⁹

*American airborne requires one jump a quarter to maintain jump pay; however, a paratrooper with the 82nd Airborne will jump at least 15-20 times in exercises and, if willing, would have the opportunity to jump as many as 50 times a year.



Unlike their American, British or French counterparts, the VDV is not operationally part of the army.** The army or ground forces, (Sukhoputnyye Voyska or SV) maintains an administrative control over the VDV, and the divisions are stationed in military districts as are SV divisions. But operationally, the VDV is a strategic asset of the Soviet Union and comes under the direct control of the Ministry of Defense. The VDV is a "mini-service." VDV officers attend a school different from the SV: the Ryazan Higher Airborne Command School in the Moscow Military District. The VDV has retained the blue collar tabs and shoulder boards of the air forces even though they were separated from the air forces in 1946, further setting them apart from the SV. They are also among the few Soviet military forces to wear berets.¹⁰

Airborne forces have traditionally possessed high strategic mobility but low tactical mobility once landed. This problem was graphically illustrated in the CBS television documentary, "Defense of the Nation," broadcast in 1981.

As part of the annual REFORGER series of exercises, a brigade of the 82nd Airborne was

**The Soviet Union has five services in its armed forces: strategic rocket forces, air forces, national air defense, navy and ground forces.

Soviet Airborne Divisions



Figure 1^a

flown by C-141 nonstop from North Carolina to northern Germany. However, once on the ground, the fastest means of moving battalions was double-timing them down the road. The jeeps that landed were dedicated to scouts and TOWs.

Such low mobility can be fatal to a mission's success: one reason the British 1st Airborne Division failed to seize and hold its objectives in Arnhem during Operation MARKET GARDEN, was the distance from the drop zone to the objectives and the shortage of vehicles. Only one battalion reached the division objective, the bridge at Arnhem, and once cut off was doomed to a futile defense. This last incident brings to mind the second tradi-

tional objection to airborne forces: low fire power. The beleaguered 2nd Parachute Battalion at Arnhem bridge had only PIAT anti-tank projectors—a handheld weapon which spring-fired an explosive anti-tank projectile about 50 meters—to stop the armor the 2nd SS Panzer Corps would throw at them to retake the bridge.¹¹

If there were a way to mechanize airborne forces to increase their tactical mobility and allow them heavier weapons, the above cited objections to airborne would be overcome. The Soviet answer to this problem is Bronevaya Maschina Destnaya, an airborne combat vehicle. The Soviet Union is mechanizing its airborne divisions.

Mechanized Airborne

The West has known about the BMD since the early 1970's; it was originally designated "Light Tank M-1970." However, in the decade since it was first seen, it has become apparent the BMD is not a light tank, but rather the world's first air droppable infantry combat vehicle. It carries a crew of seven or eight men, and is obviously designed for high firepower and high mobility.

The vehicle is divided into three compartments. The forward compartment seats the driver in the center with the vehicle/squad commander to his left and a machine gunner to his right; the machine gunner controls two bow-mounted PKT machine guns

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(2,000 rounds apiece). The center compartment contains a weapons turret very similar, if not identical to that found on the BMP-A. It mounts the same 73mm gun with a 40-round autoloader, a similar SAGGER launching rail (three missiles) and a PKT coaxial machine gun (2,000 rounds). The aft compartment seats three (four in some sources) airborne troopers who also have an RPG-7V (five rounds).

For mobility, the BMD features a high horsepower to weight ratio, track tension adjustable from the driver's compartment, adjustable hydromatic suspension, and a hydrojet system similar to that of the PT-76. Estimated maximum speeds are between 60 kph and 80 kph on land, and 10 kph on water.¹²

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has revealed a major variant of the BMD, tentatively identified as BMD-M1980. It has six road wheels to the basic BMD's five, four support rollers vice three, and is turretless. It has been seen in two basic roles, suggesting two subvariants: one carrying canvas and a sectioned mast, perhaps an antenna, suggesting a command vehicle; the second as a prime mover for a ZU-23 anti-aircraft system.¹³ For the remainder of this article, the basic combat vehicle will be referred to as BMD-1, following a pattern shown in some writings about the vehicle; the command subvariant of the BMD-M1980 will be referred to as the BMD-U, following the usual Soviet pattern in designating command variants (although it is unknown at present if the pattern has been followed in the case of the BMD); and the prime mover will remain BMD-M1980. "BMD" will be used as a generic term covering all variants.

The extent of mechanization of the VDV is unclear, with the number of BMD's in an airborne division being estimated anywhere from 128, assuming one

BMD regiment per division,¹⁴ to 346, assuming the entire division is mechanized.¹⁵ Also uncertain is the extent of BMD production. About 3,000 would have to be produced to fully mechanize all eight divisions, not an impossible number considering normal Soviet production runs and the fact the vehicle has been in production since the early 1970's. One interesting note from an article in *Army*, written from Soviet professional military publications, stated "every Soviet airborne squad is now mounted in a BMD-1."¹⁶ From this statement, the appearance of variants, and the extensive use of BMD's in airborne units in Afghanistan, it is my assessment that the Soviet intention is to fully equip the VDV with the BMD, although this goal may not have yet been realized.

A BMD regiment is usually credited with 107 BMD's,¹⁷ although no source available to this writer has broken down the number of BMD's by type. It is generally agreed, however, that a

BMD company has 10 BMD-1's.¹⁸ If a BMD regiment follows the pattern of a BMP regiment, there would then be 31 BMD-1's in each of three battalions. As a BMD-M1980 was photographed in Afghanistan towing a ZU-23, it is not illogical to assume the BMD-M1980 as prime mover for the regiment's six ZU-23's and six 120mm mortars, these being the principle support weapons within the regiment. This would still leave two BMD's unaccounted for, and it is my estimate that these are a BMD-1 and a BMD-U for regimental headquarters, again following the pattern of BMP regiments.¹⁹

Of the remainder of the 346 BMD's usually credited to the complete BMD division, two are with division headquarters—probably BMD-U's*; three are in the divisional reconnaissance company—most likely BMD-1's*; seven are in divisional artillery—possibly replacing the normal

*This writer's estimate.

The BMD-Equipped Airborne Regiment




Figure 2

BRDM-U's and BTR-60PU's with BMD-U's*; and 13 are in divisional engineer battalion—most probably BMD-1's with possibly one BMD-U*.²⁰

Unique among armored vehicles in service with airborne forces worldwide, the BMD can be parachute dropped.** The vehicle uses a VPS-3 multiple parachute system which can be rigged by two crew members if supervised by a rigger. The VPS-8 includes an explosive device to separate the parachutes from the cargo pallet once it reaches the ground. Rocket braking devices are commonly used.²¹

The usual Soviet airborne landing is either regimental or larger, supporting frontal objectives up to 300 km behind enemy lines, or battalion-sized or smaller, supporting army objectives up to 100 km behind enemy lines. One or two drop zones are used per regiment, and the drops are usually made at night. Soviet doctrine for unmechanized airborne forces calls for the drop to be made on the objective, or at least within 5 km of it. With the introduction of the BMD, a Soviet commander is not restricted by distance to the objective when selecting a drop zone. Trading off the need for a larger drop zone for the BMD's, the new zone does not have to be within 5 km of the objective; rather it can be selected for size and security, and could conceivably be 20 or 30 km from the objective. The greater distance to the objective will have the additional benefit of obscuring the airborne unit's final objective.

*This writer's estimate.

**The M551A1 Sheridan has grown to a weight where it must now be dropped by the Low Altitude Parachute Extraction System (22). The Soviet ASU-57 is leaving Soviet service as the BMD comes in (23). The British used to parachute drop Ferrets, but have apparently given up the practice. The Scorpion is air droppable, but not in service with British airborne (24).

The BMD-Equipped Airborne Division




Figure 3

With the scarce resources usually available for rear area protection in NATO, such an uncertainty would seriously strain units assigned to rear area protection. Given the scarcity of anti-armor weapons usually available to such units, a BMD-equipped airborne unit should be able to overwhelm almost any objective. A parachute drop of just one BMD battalion has the potential to reduce a corps rear to chaos.

Projection

As BMD-equipped airborne battalions and regiments possess great potential for general war, and BMD-equipped divisions given the Soviet Union a potential air-portable rapid deployment force, it is appropriate to examine the Soviet capability to project such forces.

The most suitable transport aircraft available to the Soviets for the transportation and air dropping of BMD's are the AN-12 Cub, which can drop 80 paratroopers or two BMD's; the IL-76 Candid, which can drop 150 paratroopers or three BMD's; and the AN-22 Cock, which can drop 300 men or four BMD's. The Cub is the most commonly used carrier, and approximately 157 Cub sorties are required to drop one

BMD-equipped airborne regiment.²⁵

The major problem in evaluating the Soviet capability to project the VDV is estimating the number of transport aircraft available. Not only should the military transport arm, Voenno-Transportnaya Aviatsiya, be counted, but the civil airline, Aeroflot, as well. The Aeroflot should be counted in any estimate of Soviet military life capabilities is no better illustrated than by example of the IL-76 Candid. The majority of Candids in service belong to Aeroflot, but a large number of these "civil" aircraft have retained their tail guns and military navigation equipment, and participate regularly in military exercises.²⁶ The best estimate this writer can arrive at, culled from a variety of sources, is a total available transport fleet of 560 AN-12, 60 AN-22, and 100 IL-76.²⁷

Through a total mobilization of the air transport assets of VTA and Aeroflot, the Soviet Union is theoretically capable of projecting a BMD-equipped airborne division 3,600 km, the nominal range of the AN-12; and a BMD-equipped regiment to 5,000 km, the nominal range of the IL-76 and AN-22.²⁸

The VTA and Aeroflot have steadily gained experience in force projection and long-range transportation over the past decade: the reinforcement of the Arab client states in the 1973 Middle East War, the projection of forces to Ethiopia (albeit most Cuban) in 1977-78, and Afghanistan in 1979-80. Apparently, the Soviets still consider their force inadequate and are looking for means to expand it.²⁹

The uses of such a large airborne force with a large, experienced transport force as backup are open to much speculation. One wonders if the Soviets would risk their entire transport fleet to drop a single division in the middle of a modern battlefield. The Soviet have shown a preference for prehostility intervention of airborne divisions, such as the 103rd Guards Airborne in Prague in 1968, or the 105th Guards Airborne in Kabul in 1979. Looking at the VDV in this light, some very interesting options become possible.

From the garrison of the 102nd Guards Airborne Division in Kishinev, the Odessa Military District, assuming there are sufficient staging facilities in the vicinity, an operational range of 3,600 km would cover the Middle East including Saudia Arabia and North Africa as far west as eastern Morocco. A 5,000 km area includes substantial portions of sub-Sahara Africa. From the garrison of the 76th Guards Airborne Division at Pskov in the Leningrad Military District, a 3,600 km radius encompasses not only all of Scandinavia, but the United Kingdom as well. Iceland is approximately 2,400 km from Pskov if a polar route over Scandinavia is used. Nome, Alaska is approximately 4,000 km from Belogorsk in the Far East Military District, the garrison of the 6th Guards Airborne Division.

Conclusion

With seven or eight combat ready divisions, the VDV is

already a force that dwarfs the airborne forces in the West. As a de facto mini-service, the VDV also remains above jurisdictional disputes of the kind that plagued the early days of the U.S. Rapid Deployment Force. The VDV then is a cohesive, powerful strategic asset of the Soviet Union.

The VDV would be a strategic threat even without the BMD, but it is the development of this diminutive infantry vehicle that combines the strategic mobility of classic airborne forces with the tactical mobility and firepower of traditional motorized rifle forces. With the heavy use of the BMD in Afghanistan and the appearance of variants, it should be assumed that the Soviet military is satisfied with its experiment with mechanized airborne and, in fact, finds it quite useful.

When the United States announced formation of the Rapid Deployment Force, the Soviet Union denounced it, but did not come up with a parallel announcement of its own rapid deployment force. It did not have to, the *Vozdushno-Desantnyye Voyska* was already there ready to go.

Footnotes

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Ethnic Problems of the Soviet Military

by Capt. Peter Goldberg

Introduction

While Soviet citizens are thoroughly versed in the alleged threats posed by NATO and China, few are aware of a possible internal cancerous growth of minorities. As their numbers continue to increase they may become the greatest threat to the Soviet state.

The Soviet military is more vulnerable to the ethnic population explosion than any other segment of Soviet society due to its role as the enforcer of foreign policy. It follows that ethnic and racial problems could impair combat readiness and weaken the Soviets internationally.

This article will determine the extent of ethnic and racial problems in the Soviet military, their effect on combat readiness, and their future impact on Soviet military preparedness.

Current Situation

Ethnic Consciousness

The Soviet Union provides a home for all or part of over 100 ethnic minorities. Twenty-two of these groups had populations greater than 1 million in the 1970 census. The census revealed that slightly over half of the population was Russian. When combined with Ukrainians and Belorussians, almost three-quarters of the population was Slavic.

From these figures one might conclude that the Slavic groups, particularly the Russians, will remain firmly in control. But, this may not be so. Population growth of Slavic ethnic groups has

become negligible. On the other hand, the non-Slavic ethnic groups, 15 percent of which are of Moslem origin, are experiencing rapid growth. From these facts, we may conclude that the Russians will probably be a minority group (less than 50 percent), when the results of the 1980 census are released.

Wherever ethnic groups are found, so are feelings of ethnic consciousness. One of the clearest examples is the Soviet language problem. Only 70 percent of the non-Russian population speak fluent Russian.¹ Despite increasing educational efforts to improve fluency among non-Russian groups, little progress is being made.

Another reflection of ethnic consciousness is religion. Officially, the Soviet Union is an atheistic state, whose stated purpose is the eradication of all religious creeds. Nevertheless, numerous religions flourish. There are the Catholic Lithuanians, the independent Christian Armenians, Jews, and the Muslim peoples.

It is significant that one out of six Soviet citizens is a Muslim. While Muslim leaders are formally submissive to the Soviet leadership, none have been accused of diluting or adulterating the faith. The Islamic faith in the Soviet Union is as pure as it was prior to the 1917 revolution. Surprisingly, it is more conservative and more traditional than the modernistic approaches typical of the Middle East.

Nationalism may be the most dangerous form of ethnic consciousness among the Muslim

peoples. After more than six decades of Russian rule, the Muslims of Central Asia continue to segregate themselves from Russian society. Instead, they identify with other Muslim peoples of the Middle East and Asia.

The official policy of the Soviet Union regarding its ethnic groups is in Article 123 of the Soviet Constitution:

The equality of the rights of citizens of the Soviet Union, irrespective of nationality or race, is an irrevocable law in all spheres of economic, public, cultural, social, and political life. Any direct or indirect restriction of rights . . . because of race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial exclusiveness, hatred, or contempt, is punishable by law.

The Soviets have gone to great lengths to advertise the equality that supposedly exists. They claim that their ethnic diversity is a source of strength,² and that a major objective of Soviet mass patriotic activity is to "solidify the people of all nationalities around the Party and the government."³

Since 1964, the Soviets have hosted numerous Muslim leaders from foreign states to conduct Islamic conferences and verify "the truth of what we (the Soviets) say concerning the freedom of Islam in our country...."⁴ Upon return to their home countries, the visiting Muslims denounce the carefully staged visits. They are then ridiculed by the "free" Soviet Islamic leaders.

It is well advertised that military units are multinational. One battery had 24 nationalities

among new recruits.⁶ An isolated anti-aircraft unit had 17 nationalities.⁶ A submarine crew had 11 nationalities.⁷ In the Red Banner Turkestan military district "companies where representatives of 12 to 15 or more nationalities serve is a normal phenomenon."⁸

The Soviets even deny the existence of anti-Semitism. They publish *Sovyetish Heymland*, a Yiddish periodical, which is essentially a propaganda tool used to denounce anti-Semitism. In late 1963, Lieutenant General Hirsh Plaskov denied the existence of anti-Semitism by referring to the large numbers of Jews in high positions in such institutions as the armed forces.

The Minority Soldier

Members of minority ethnic groups do reach high positions in the military. In 1962, David Dragunski, a Jew, was a general in the armed forces. But he was the exception, not the rule. And when a minority individual does

attain officer status, he must be very careful. Extreme risk exists for the Soviet military officer who defends the political and cultural interests of his native people.

It is difficult for the minority individual to attain officer rank, because of prerequisites. The Soviet military journals, especially *Krasnaya Zvezda*, periodically announce openings in various officer cadet training schools. Among other requirements, applicants must demonstrate a command of the Russian language and a knowledge of Russian literature. The requirement to speak Russian discourages non-Russian applicants, and effectively eliminates them.⁹


The use of a single language is logical and necessary for command and control. Russian is the language of the armed forces. But this has caused major communications problems since many non-Russians do not speak Russian fluently.

Once in the military, an individual's chances for training, selection for command, or assignment to a particular unit or type of unit are highly dependent on the perceived loyalties of one's nationality.

As a result of the establishment's fear of minority loyalty, only token numbers from minority ethnic groups are found in high priority military units, including strategic rocket forces, air defense, air force, motorized rifle, armor, and artillery. Those few that are assigned usually end up in construction, supply or rear service units. Central Asians are invariably assigned to non-technical work.

A hierarchy of reliability has developed with the Russians at the top of the ladder, followed by other Slavic groups, including the Belorussians and (eastern) Ukrainians, and then the Georgians, Armenians, and the Baltic nationalities. The Central Asians

Soviet Muslim Nationalities and Foreign 'Brother' Groups



Adapted from: Benningsen, Alexandre; Soviet Muslims and the World of Islam; Problems of Communism, Volume XXIX, Number 2, March-April 1980.

are on the bottom rung.¹⁰

In a further attempt to reduce ethnic consciousness, minorities are generally stationed outside their home republics. This is part of an overall plan to establish a sense of pride in being a Soviet citizen, rather than loyalty to an ethnic group.

Discussion

Minorities have meant worsening problems for the Russian leadership. The percent of non-Slavic males in the draft pool is increasing rapidly. Since general educational levels are improving, this does not mean a decrease in pre-induction technical expertise. But it does mean that the Soviets will be forced to use more non-Russians in leadership, combat, and technical roles. This is further aggravated by a general decrease in Slavic civilian manpower. This reduction in manpower in the western, industrialized Soviet Union, will probably result in a drain of technically competent Slavic people from military careers.

Force Size

It has been suggested that Soviet leaders might reduce the size of their armed forces in order to maintain the current military racial balance, simultaneously assuring adequate manpower availability for industry. Such a reduction is not likely in view of the aggressive nature of Soviet foreign policy. It is more probable that the Soviets would more readily accept a reduced economy, rather than a degradation of military might.


Prejudice

As the relative numbers of ethnic minorities increase, a change can be expected in their use. The more sensitive units, such as the strategic rocket forces and border guard units, can be expected to remain pure, but other combat units will begin to receive greater numbers of ethnic minorities. The minority soldier will assume greater combat responsibility and a reduced support role.

As ethnic groups increase in number, their individual nationalistic sentiments will likely create greater friction among Soviet soldiers. While there has been no evidence to suggest that this has been a great problem, the Soviets recognize the potential significance of inter-ethnic antagonism:

... the slightest hostility among the personnel of a squad, team, or crew can lead to a disproportionate impairment in combat readiness.¹¹

Composition of Soviet Draft Pool



Language Barrier

The changing ethnic mix will probably mean a decreasing Russian language fluency, making training more difficult. Those lacking fluency are at an obvious disadvantage. This is compounded by the fear of humiliation which prevents soldiers from seeking clarification.

During peacetime, the language barrier creates serious problems in efficiency and morale. In combat, the problem could be disastrous:

With the development of military science and the growing complexity of military technology, the importance of the Russian language in the life of the army is growing. Nowadays military operations develop exceedingly fast... In a battle situation the very minimum of time can be allowed for explaining

assignments and orders.

There is no time for anyone to translate a command mentally from one language into another: he must understand it and proceed to carry it out instantaneously. And this can be done only by a soldier with a fluent knowledge of Russian.¹²

Additionally, the language barrier can only serve to further isolate the individual ethnic groups.

Nationalism

The greatest danger that the Soviets face from the growth of non-Slavic ethnic groups is that of nationalistic sentiment. This is primarily due to an outgrowth of religious activity and family ties in bordering states, and partly to resentment stemming from the colonial relationship of their economic ties to European Russia. These feelings can create significant difficulties for the Russians.

Since the early post revolutionary period, elements of the Soviet Muslim political elite have sought to export communist ideas and revolutionary energy to neighboring Islamic countries using Soviet Muslim cadre. On occasion, this has been extended to suggestions of annexation of all or parts of Afghanistan and Iran. The consequences of such annexation are clear. It would mean a strengthening of the Soviet Muslim's political and demographic position in the Soviet Union. Stalin denounced position in the Soviet Union. Stalin denounced such ideas as "bourgeois nationalism," and the outspoken proponents of those ideas have been purged.¹³

Within the armed forces, loyalty during conflict is of paramount concern. While this is a potential problem during a NATO/Warsaw Pact conflict, it would probably reach its greatest expression during a Sino-Soviet conflict or, as has already been found, when military might is used to enforce Soviet Middle Eastern foreign policy.

Both the Chinese and the Soviets recognize the dangers inherent in the Mongol peoples (1.5 million in China, 1 million in the Mongolian People's Republic, 0.3 million in the Soviet Union), especially along the western third of the Sino-Soviet border. An ethnically complex area, primarily Uigurs and Kazakhs, this zone is the location of an intense propaganda war. Neither super power can rely on the loyalty of these peoples during an armed conflict. For example, during World War II massive numbers of Kazakhs defected to China and Afghanistan. Potentially more significant is that, during an armed Sino-Soviet conflict, these non-Russians groups might seek to establish independent states.

Within the Middle East, the Soviet Muslim soldier is a distinct liability. This soldier feels greater loyalty to the people with whom he has religious identity, than to

the Soviet state. The military leadership recognizes this and have tried to compensate for it. It was learned from a Soviet Muslim soldier (a Turkman) who defected to the Afghan rebels, that Russian officers told them that they were not fighting Muslims, but some kind of pagan.¹⁴

In addition to possible defection, the Soviets face the increased likelihood of nationalist feelings imported to the Soviet Union via Soviet Muslim soldiers. Recent events in Iran and Afghanistan have shown the Soviets how powerful a force such a movement might be.

Soviet Solutions

The Soviets have employed three techniques for handling their ethnic problem. The first of these has been repression as has already been discussed. The second has been via population

control, but efforts to decrease Central Asian population growth rates, while encouraging larger Russian families has been, by-and-large, unsuccessful.

The last method, Russification, has also failed. Education, language training, and stationing of minorities outside their home republics has borne little fruit in the development of pan-Soviet pride.

Resistance to a unified Soviet people is not limited to the minorities. Many of the Slavic peoples, especially the Great Russians, are experiencing a form of nationalism. They are frustrated with attempts to integrate their culture with other groups. More than simple mixing, they fear the ultimate "biological degradation" that will result from mixed marriages.¹⁵ This Slavic resistance to integration can only intensify the problems facing the Soviet leadership.

Continued on page 49



Soviet Ground Forces, include men from many ethnic groups. This group of soldiers from a motorized rifle unit includes (left to right) a Yokut, Kozakh, Uzbek, Belorussian, Russian, Armenian, and Ukrainian. Photo from *Understanding Soviet Military Developments*, AST-11005-100-77

THE CASE FOR HOME DIVISION TRAINING: OPFOR

by Capt. Michael L. Nelson

A deep rumble reverberated in the chilly night air. The tanks and supporting armored personnel carriers were approximately 3000 meters away, but in the still night they sounded much closer. They were on the move and headed straight for our position, the attacking column's objective. Eyes strained in the darkness in an effort to detect movement, but it was useless. Nothing could be seen.

The attacking columns scrambled to close the distance between themselves and the objective. At 2000 meters, one could distinctly hear an engine shift into high gear and another into low as minor obstacles were breached. The familiar creak of sprockets meshing with steel belted treads could be clearly discerned above the roar of the engines.

Thrill and anticipation were evident among the small group of men huddled at the objective. As the attacking columns passed the 1,000 meter marker, the first illuminating flare burst in the night sky. This procedure would be repeated at regular intervals so the defending force could see and be seen by the attacking force.

The columns were sighted at 500 meters. The tanks, physically imposing in daylight, appeared even larger in the night. As an added safety precaution, we switched on vehicular lights so there would be no mistaking the location of our observation post.

The ground trembled as wave after wave of the attacking columns climbed a small embankment and began the bypass maneuver. The formations were as perfect as could be expected with the limited visibility. Green phosphorescent tubes had been attached to antenna masts and were used for reference markers to keep the columns in tight march formations. Hardly discernable to the naked eye, they looked like so many fireflies as the antennas bounced and weaved with the movement of the vehicles over the uneven terrain.

The last of the columns moved on and again became invisible in the night, their next objective: the assembly areas. There, they prepared for the next day's training. For all practical purposes the night's exercise was a complete success.

What has just been described was a night field training exercise conducted by the 1st Squadron, 10th U.S. Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) at Fort Carson, Colo. However, this was no ordinary battle drill. The Cav, for the entire week, had been learning to move, fight, and replicate, in every detail, an OPFOR Motorized Rifle Battalion. The reasons for this are simple.

Many of the battalions and Task Forces visiting the U.S. Army National Training Center at Fort Irwin, Calif., find the training to be quite an ordeal. This comes as no surprise. The rugged terrain and well-trained OPFOR units encountered there offer a unique experience for visiting units.

The realism of battle offers many challenges to a commander

and his staff. When confronted with literally hundreds of decisions during the course of a battle, it is impossible to choose the best option every time. The commander often finds out that what he thought were his strengths are actually his weaknesses and vice versa. This is why the NTC exists. It provides realistic combat training in an environment that allows the units to live and learn

from their mistakes. What happens when the NTC training is over? Hopefully, the unit returns to garrison and begins to train on those shortcomings that became evident at the NTC. On the other hand, units that are scheduled to train at the NTC may not have discovered their most glaring weakness. To increase the odds of success on the next battlefield, training is required. This is where the dilemma begins.

The projected time between training visits to the NTC by participating battalions is 18 months. During this cycle, units may lose many officers and non-commissioned officers through transfer, separation, or retirement. With these personnel

losses, the experience and lessons learned at the NTC are partially lost by the unit, if not lost entirely. When this occurs, a unit's combat power is reduced severely. It is imperative that units train against an adversary that uses the same tactics as those used by OPFOR units at the NTC. If it is not feasible to frequent the NTC, have a portion of the NTC frequent the unit. Training can be scheduled to reinforce and supplement the lessons learned at the NTC.

The concept of home division training (HDT) can help improve the combat effectiveness of a unit despite large personnel losses.

The idea of HDT was formulated by Maj. Gen. John W. Hudachek, former commander of

the 4th Infantry Division. The Cav was chosen to perform the role of the OPFOR.

An Armored Cavalry Squadron is a uniquely tailored outfit. Each of the three maneuver ground troops have 12 M60A1 tanks, six improved TOW vehicles, six M113A2 scout vehicles, three mortar carriers, and three command tracks. The Air Cav Troop includes nine AH-1S gunships, seven UH-1 lift helicopters and 10 OH-58 scout helicopters. With the supporting vehicles in all of the troops the Cav represents a combined arms force more than capable of replicating an OPFOR Motorized Rifle Battalion.

In early April, the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command, OPFOR Training Detachment (RED THRUST), Lt. Col. Alan D. Lecklitner, visited the Cav to coordinate and explain the training that would transform the Cav into an OPFOR strike force.

The support that the RED THRUST training team needed was minimal. Lecklitner noted that the Cav would be the first large-sized unit within CONUS to be trained in an OPFOR role outside of those found at the NTC.

The RED THRUST training team arrived in June. The seven member team, headed by Capt. Allen E. Curtis, began training in the classroom. All key personnel, E-5 and above, were assembled and given a presentation on the forthcoming training. The objective was clear. By the end of five and one-half days of demanding training, the Cav would be able to replicate an OPFOR Motorized Rifle Battalion. (It must be mentioned that OPFOR doctrine does not necessarily match Soviet doctrine. Like the U.S., Soviet tactics change daily. OPFOR doctrine is close enough to adequately represent the speed, power and mass of Soviet doctrine.)



A Cav soldier performs maintenance on a tank. (Photo courtesy of Colorado Sun Newspaper)

The training began June 13th. With each new tactic taught, all key personnel performed extensive walk-through procedures. Once everyone had a thorough understanding of each set of flag signals, the mounted operations progressed rapidly. The Cav soldiers grasped all of the training quickly, allowing the schedule to be accelerated. The highlight of the training was the night FTX (described earlier) in which the entire movement was made without the use of radios. The rapid movement to contact, in perfect formation, was impressive.

An added benefit the Cav received from the OPFOR training was the practice of cross-over (transfer) skills. The cross-over skills are common to both OPFOR and U.S. tactics. The RED THRUST Detachment has extensively documented these for publication. The major advantages are listed below:

- Junior leaders have the opportunity to exercise command and control over subordinate elements.
- Maneuver elements practice radio discipline procedures while exercising control over subordinate elements.
- Cross-country driving was achieved at higher than normal speeds and in tight formations. This increases driver and crew confidence and skill.
- Noise and light discipline are strictly enforced.
- Identification of Soviet vehicles and equipment is reinforced with training.
- OPFOR practices strict adherence to disciplined convoy procedures.
- Emphasis is placed on accuracy of reconnaissance patrol reporting.

A reinforced OPFOR MRC prepares to march in column formation. (Photo courtesy of Colorado Sun Newspaper)

- Greater skills at fighting on the move is achieved, especially relating to target acquisition.
- Maintenance discipline becomes a high priority.
- A greater understanding of how the OPFOR soldier fights on the move day or night is gained by the Cav soldiers.

Although the schedule was demanding, the Cav soldiers remained enthusiastic throughout the training.

With training completed and the out-briefings finished, the Cav was ready to perform in the HDT role.

Subsequent OPFOR missions against 4th Infantry Division battalions proved the training to be invaluable. After each encounter, there are techniques of battle that have been improved by "blue forces" as well as the OPFOR.

The case for HDT is strong. Divisional units have the opportunity to train against the same tactics used at the NTC without leaving home. This training will also raise the tactical proficiency of newly-assigned soldiers.

As for the soldiers of the 1st Squadron, 10th Cavalry, they have the opportunity to practice their real-world mission, that of fighting and reporting on the move.



Capt. Michael L. Nelson is assigned as the S-2, 1st Squadron, 10th U.S. Cavalry, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), at Fort Carson, Colo.



Special Operations Forces of the Soviet Union

by Capt. Tom Adams

During the years since World War II, and especially the last decade, the Soviet Union has developed and deployed a variety of commando or special operations forces apart from those within their conventional forces. By their very nature, almost all special operations missions are directed against enemy rear targets.

Commando and special operations missions fall into a separate category of military endeavor and are normally carried out by one of the three types of Soviet special operation units. These types are:

Reydoviki (Raiders)—The largest category of special operations unit, these are organized as brigades. They are similar to U.S. Army Rangers and carry out similar types of direct action missions. There are known to be six brigades of Reydoviki, each of about 2,500 men. Each brigade has an air transport service unit and three or four parachute battalions of three or four companies each. Most companies have 60 men organized into six commando squads. One other company has from 80 to 100 men and contains most of the unit's heavy weapons including the SPG-9 recoilless rifle and light mortars such as the 82mm M-1937. Vehicles consist of GAZ 69 series wheeled trucks.

Vysotniki—A much smaller group, these units are probably organized into battalions and specialize in partisan operations including raising, training, supporting and commanding guerrilla forces behind the enemy lines. These units are also trained in "exotic" infiltration methods such as HALO parachuting and SCUBA. Vysotniki are comparable to U.S. Army Special Forces.

"Diversionary" troops of the GRU

(**Soviet Military Intelligence**)—These are highly specialized organizations trained for sabotage and subversion missions. These allegedly include "masquerade" units supplied with NATO uniforms and equipment and speaking NATO languages. Such units would attempt to disrupt NATO operations by spreading confusion and causing NATO forces to take extreme countermeasures which would in themselves hamper operations. It is believed that during the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia these troops helped capture the Prague airport while dressed as civilian advisors and technicians. Soviet special service forces, presumably GRU troops, also supported the invasion of Afghanistan through unconventional warfare operations and may have played a role in the elimination of President Amin. Other missions might include kidnapping or assassinating important economic, political or military officials.

All Soviet special operations troops are politically reliable volunteers. They undergo training programs of up to three years under the instruction of long-term cadre personnel. Much of this training is conducted in NATO languages and while wearing NATO uniforms. Languages taught include English, German, Danish, Italian and Dutch. The customs, habits and jargon of the NATO forces are also taught. One Soviet special operations unit is known to be deployed in the German Democratic Republic.

All Soviet special operations and unconventional warfare activities are closely controlled by senior civilian political authorities through the Committee for State Security (KGB). Normally, the KGB and GRU screen, select and train special operations and unconventional warfare personnel. Generally speaking, the GRU units are concerned with activities in direct support of combat forces.

While Reydoviki are trained as elite conventional infantry, other special operations forces are usually trained as teams. These units are configured

much like U.S. Army Special Forces teams with an officer in charge of several enlisted specialists. These groups spend much time learning special skills such as infiltration, sabotage, survival, clandestine communications and the like, in addition to conventional training.

Infiltration techniques employed by the various special operations organizations are as varied as the types of missions performed and are limited only by the imagination of the planners. Among the infiltration methods used are parachute infiltration, both high level and low level; landing from fast patrol boats, submarines or small craft from merchant vessels; foot, ski, snowshoe, light vehicles and, of course, by helicopter, either landed or lowered by rope or winch or ladder.

Partisan operations in the enemy rear

Little unclassified information is available on the Soviet plans to conduct partisan (guerrilla) operations in the NATO rear. During World War II, the Soviet Union made considerable use of partisan forces and certainly will attempt to do so again. Within the Soviet armed forces, Vysotniki battalions have been created for the specific purpose of raising, training and leading partisan groups behind enemy lines. In this respect, they are similar to U.S. Special Forces, which have a similar wartime mission.

By fighting, sabotage, selective assassination and intimidation of the civilian population, properly deployed partisans in strategic areas could tie down significant enemy forces. During World War II, Soviet planners adopted a four phase plan for use of partisan forces. First of all, sabotage groups were created where none existed by covert action forces controlled by the CPSU central committee. Next, a policy of selective support was used, under which successful partisan groups were supported and encouraged while unsuccessful ones were abandoned or ignored. Third, a

Vysotniki-type training mission was sent to aid in training the partisans. Finally, special operations troops were sent to aid the fighting and keep up partisan morale.

Representatives of the Soviet intelligence services were used as liaisons between the partisan units and the army. This ensured that partisan activities enhanced and did not conflict with regular army operations.

On the modern battlefield, these forces could have considerable impact. Modern partisan/special troop operations are controlled by the KGB operating with the GRU. The leadership of the GRU consists of professional KGB staff officers rather than military men.

Those partisan agents not already in place prior to the outbreak of hostilities would be air dropped or infiltrated by sea into the area of operations. Covert operations affiliated with the KGB would already be in place. These persons have long established identities in the target area and would carry out intelligence related activities not possible for conventional reconnaissance. Such individuals would be expected to assist partisan operations by infiltrating enemy civil and military organizations.

These agents would cooperate with partisans and special operations forces to provide local knowledge, language proficiency and cover identities if required. Partisan groups could also be expected to provide refuge for special operations forces after they complete their missions and to assist the members of such forces in escape and evasion by establishing a network for this purpose.

Like all special operations, partisan operations would generally take place at night or during bad weather. Unless reinforced by regular army elements, they would avoid open

combat and conduct continuous attacks against enemy communications and supply systems. Use of radios and expedient airfields would allow the partisans to receive some resupply but the bulk of their needs would be drawn from the operational area.

Perhaps the most important role of partisan forces would be locating targets for the special operations units of the regular Soviet ground forces, developing intelligence on these targets and assisting the special operations units in post-mission withdrawals.

Partisan groups are composed of civilians friendly to the Soviet cause, operating as guerrillas in the enemy rear area. Partisan operations are most likely when former Soviet or Soviet-occupied areas are overrun by NATO forces. Since such operations call for a large network of sympathizers and supporters in the civilian population, it is unlikely that extensive partisan operations would be undertaken in NATO countries themselves. However, even a small partisan organization devoted to intelligence and assistance of Soviet special operations units could constitute a significant danger in the NATO rear.

Soviet naval infantry operations

Three naval infantry regiments are currently deployed with the Northern, Baltic and Black Sea fleets. Two regiments are deployed in the Pacific Ocean opposite China, Korea and Japan.

The Soviet naval infantry is known to have fielded an apparently small number of specially trained assault teams. These organizations are believed to be trained in raiding, ambush, reconnaissance and intelligence missions. Apparently similar to the U.S. Navy SEALs, these units have received extensive specialty

training in demolitions, unarmed combat, and both parachute and underwater operations. Presumably these units would also be used for naval related missions in a manner similar to the army Reydiviki.

These troops are also known to have participated in heliborne exercises. According to Soviet publications, one mission for these troops would be to block off enemy reserves heading toward a beachhead.

The naval reconnaissance company is also of special interest here. This organization is equipped with PT-76 amphibious light tanks and BRDM scout vehicles which may be carried ashore by naval landing craft or swim ashore after being launched at sea. Troops may also be landed by the GUS aircushion vehicle which has a lift capability of about 50 troops, offering the possibility of quickly placing the naval reconnaissance company well beyond the beach. Elements may be air-landed by helicopter or dropped by parachute.

The objective of these recon teams is two-fold; report enemy positions, dispositions and strength, and provide flank security for an amphibious landing force and screen forward of the landing force.

The reconnaissance company may also have a limited SCUBA capability which is most likely used for clearing beach obstacles or reconnaissance of landing areas.

Due to their specialized training, it is possible that these units will be assigned to carry out seaborne raids against the enemy rear area. Soviet publications have reported airborne raids into the enemy tactical rear by specially trained naval infantry assault teams. Team members had received training in demolitions, unarmed combat, parachute and underwater operations.

The Cryptocorner

by **Walter B. Howe**

We once again challenge you with a pair of encrypted poems. The first is easier than the second. The cipher alphabets for both poems are different, but both use the same keyword in

one sequence with standard A through Z order in the other. Good luck!

**HKJRCJTCJA KJHN
GKON RBCQ RCGN
VCRB HOYLKKAOSGQ
KXRNJ QTPFCGN.
KTO LKNRCH HCLBNOQ
XKO JNV ATYQ SJI**

**FCXNOQ
SON JKR UNOY AONSR,
PTR RBNY OBYGN.**

**OWGZF YIPJ PTZB,
ZPRIVQ IVP FIENX.
CGTRL BIEG SGTWVZ
WO BIE XTD PVIENX.**

Answer to Cryptocorner on page 58

HOW TO SUCCEED AS BATTALION S2

by 1st Lt. Clair E. Conzelman

Ever wonder why, as a tank or infantry battalion S2, your commander never lets you do your "proper" job? Does the staff treat you as an assistant S3? Do you learn what the next operation is going to be when you read the published operations order? If so, you need to read this article! If not, you may already be doing some or all of the steps described below, but this article may organize your method of operations a little better. In any case, the following will attempt to refine how maneuver battalion S2s interact with their unit staffs and suggest steps to help new S2s on their way towards a successful and rewarding tour.

The battalion S2 is usually the junior ranking officer on the staff as a second or first lieutenant. He is also, usually, the least acquainted with combat arms operations. This often translates into lost credibility and lack of trust by other members of the staff in the S2s ability to materially contribute to accomplishing battalion objectives, whether in garrison or in the field. At least half the battalion commanders I have observed consider their S2 to be important as a military policeman and only marginally effective in aiding the commander to lead the battle. To cure this, the entire image of the "typical Military Intelligence S2" must be destroyed and replaced by a professional combat officer whom the commander relies upon to help defeat the enemy. To accomplish this drastic measure, I suggest each S2 evaluate how well he has or will adopt the following steps:

First step. Put as many physical security, personnel security, M577 maintenance, maps, and logistics duties on your NCO as he can handle. These are all tasks your NCO and his private should be able to accomplish and which, if you personally do any of them, will detract from your mission as intelligence officer. Don't settle for the E8 who can't handle a 1st Sgt. slot so they "stuck" him in S2. Get good quality material and take good care of him. Of course, you must take the time to train a new NCO to your standards, and then keep updated on the security and logistics situations so you stay

informed when the XO asks you when your M577's next "Q-service" date is, or when the last arms room was inspected.

Second step. Know what your battalion commander wants from you. He may not have specific requirements, but if he does, carry them out 120 percent or suggest ways to improve them so you are able to. You serve him personally as well as serving your Army—directed S2 responsibilities (which he may not even be aware of). Make yourself invaluable to his planning, training, and leading efforts, and you will have earned most of your salary.

Third step. Develop innovative ways to do your job. This usually translates to giving the commander more than he asks for in terms of training, organizing, and mission accomplishment. Give him everything he might be able to use for his planning and decision making during the battle. Help the S3 write the details for the operations order to insure that OPSEC and collection gathering is covered. Show the commander a terrain-relief overlay so he can quickly get a "bird's eye" view of the terrain. Don't let him overlook a hidden bridge, or an important small fold in the terrain, or the effects of fog. Present your intelligence in a simple, quick format so you don't clutter his head with unnecessary figures or unimportant detail (that means you have to know what is important to a combat commander before you start). Brigade and higher is where complex collection plans, detailed avenues of approach, and terrain analysis usually belong. A battalion often has one or two logical avenues of approach, and not much analysis is needed for a combat arms lieutenant colonel to picture what can come at him. Remember, don't show off what you can do...tell him what he doesn't already know.

Step four. Organize your shop operations. Be the model of efficiency by always meeting suspenses, knowing the details of your job thoroughly (read all the applicable regulations and field manuals), and train your personnel well. Pay attention to AGI and other inspection checklists. Write good job descriptions for each of your

personnel so they know exactly what their duties are. Finally, keep a good filing system.

Step five. Keep people informed of your on-going actions. In the field, this means giving the CO and S3 frequent enemy updates (but not every spot report). For this, you must be at the TAC, or wherever the S3 and CO spend most of their time. You cannot do your job in the rear where you can only talk to your CO by radio. In garrison, the XO is your main contact. See him daily and briefly tell what you did that day or yesterday and what you plan to accomplish the rest of the week and month.

Step six. Evaluate and re-evaluate your job performance. What new ways can you improve your guard security, your personnel security workflow, or your intelligence gathering for the next operation? Does an operating procedure need to be written? Can you improve the commo set-up in your M577? Are you ready for a document security inspection? Is the unit map basic load up to date?

The above suggestions were not designed to describe what the battalion S2's job is, but rather how we can improve our contributions to the battle, be it in garrison or in combat. Military Intelligence officers must strive, at battalion level, to be just as instrumental towards the battalion accomplishing its peacetime missions as everyone expects him to be towards the unit's wartime objectives.

Beginning with the January-March issue, MI Magazine is introducing a new department - Point of View.

We solicit your views on a specific topic and publish your responses in the next quarterly issue.

Our first question deals with CEWI. Now that CEWI has moved from concept to reality, is it a viable operation and will it meet the intelligence and electronic warfare requirements of the AirLand battle? Why or why not?

Send your answers to MI Magazine, Box 569, Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613, or call Autovon 879-3609 USAICS hot line.

Please leave your name and unit with your response.

COMBAT RECONNAISSANCE: SOVIET STYLE

by Andrew W. Hull

The Soviet armed forces have two types of military intelligence—strategic and combat.¹ Strategic intelligence is the responsibility of the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff and concentrates on broadbrush assessments of foreign military strengths, capabilities and intentions. The GRU accomplishes these tasks through undercover agents, military attaches, technical collection mechanisms, analysis of foreign military equipment, and reading foreign open literature. Combat intelligence, by contrast, deals with short term intelligence needs of Soviet combat zone commanders and is the responsibility of troops in the field. Within the category of combat intelligence, Soviet commanders place primary emphasis on reconnaissance operations.

Importance of Reconnaissance

The writings of senior Soviet officers often stress the importance of reconnaissance for any successful operation. Lieutenant General R. Rizatdinov, chief of staff of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces, for example, states:

Reconnaissance is the most important form of combat support. It is difficult to count on victory without having surpassed the enemy in the art of conducting it . . . Not a step without reconnaissance!²

Major General F. Gredasov comments in a similar vein:

It would be impossible to make a suitable decision in combat without knowing the enemy, his intentions, his combat capabilities, his strong and weak sides, and the terrain on which the mission is to be executed.³

Since senior Soviet officers consider reconnaissance important, they stress the responsibility of commanders at every level to supplement information received from higher authorities through their own collection activities.

This Soviet concern with the acquisition of timely and accurate combat intelligence is reflected in the organization of troop units from army to regiment. Each Soviet army contains a specialized combat intelligence battalion as well as an intelligence section in the headquarters staff which is responsible for planning the collection of combat intelligence, collating and analyzing information received, and disseminating finished reports.⁴ Below the army level each division has one dedicated reconnaissance battalion consisting of approximately 300 men.⁵ For example, within a motorized rifle division, these men are equipped with 20 BRDM reconnaissance vehicles and five light tanks in addition to the usual small arms.⁶ Regiments also have specialized combat intelligence gathering organs in the form of reconnaissance companies.⁷ (I could find no direct

evidence of reconnaissance platoons per se at company level, but Soviet military authors make it clear that company commanders are often assigned reconnaissance missions.)

Reconnaissance units have very definite priorities according to Soviet military literature. Some of the main objectives of their mission are to determine the location of enemy troops, their strength, disposition, fire plan, and the extent of the enemy's reserve forces. Reconnaissance troops strive to ascertain the type of weapon held by the enemy facing them, the nature of the terrain, likelihood of enemy movement, (either forward or to the rear) in the immediate future, and information concerning the personal characteristics of enemy commanders.

Intelligence Gathering Techniques

Because of the high priority the Soviets place on reconnaissance and the methodical nature of their doctrine, military writers devote considerable attention to techniques for conducting reconnaissance in combat zones. Analysis of Soviet military publications reveal the following approved techniques: observation, electronic eavesdropping, photography, raids and ambushes, capture and interrogation of prisoners, electronic range-finding, and reconnaissance in force.

The first, and most obvious, approach to gathering intelli-

gence is simple observation along the frontlines. Each Soviet soldier is trained to watch for signs of strength and weakness in enemy positions as well as for the kind of weapons the enemy is using. Soviet troops also learn to estimate distances accurately and to recognize major terrain features of tactical importance. The value of these observation skills is enhanced through frequent practice making concise reports during training exercises.


Soviet combat intelligence collection techniques run the gamut from simple procedures like observation to sophisticated techniques that rely on complex equipment. Electronic range-finding equipment is a popular way of locating enemy positions. Soviet tactical intelligence per-

sonnel also employ radio intercept equipment against enemy wireless communications. Soviet tactical communications intelligence is not limited to targeting just radio traffic. Reconnaissance troops will sometimes penetrate enemy lines to tap ground wire communications systems. Such signal intelligence operations are particularly important, according to Soviet writers, as a source of information about enemy intentions as well as data on the composition and numerical strength of enemy forces.

Intelligence-reconnaissance units will sometimes dispatch small teams to conduct in-depth, behind-the-lines raids and ambushes. One object of these raids is to kill enemy soldiers and to destroy equipment or commun-

ications centers in order to create confusion. More importantly from an intelligence standpoint, raids are aimed at locating troop concentrations, detecting behind-the-lines troop movements, pinpointing major military facilities, and capturing documents and personal letters for later analysis by headquarters intelligence officers. Such reconnaissance teams often set up ambushes in the hope of capturing prisoners (particularly officers) who can be taken back to Soviet lines and interrogated in detail. In the past, the Soviets made frequent use of the techniques of raids and ambushes; for example, one division conducted 60 raids and 23 ambushes behind German lines in January of 1943.⁶

Soviet commanders can order reconnaissance in force behind enemy lines by battalion and company sized units in addition to launching small scale infiltration by teams of a few men. The primary objective of reconnaissance in force is to ascertain the configuration of the enemy's



Combat reconnaissance is the responsibility of the commanders in the combat zone.

defenses, his fire plan, and the nature of any existing secondary positions behind the front. During the second half of World War II, it was standard procedure for Russian commanders to initiate front-wide reconnaissance in force 24-hours prior to any offensive. Given current Soviet reverence for the lessons of World War II and their applicability for today, it is reasonable to assume that the same rules will hold for any offensive the Soviets launch in future conflicts.

Photo reconnaissance is the last major technique used by the Soviets in gathering intelligence. Responsibility for carrying out photo reconnaissance is assigned to aviation units, but they receive their targeting information and mission requests from ground force commanders.⁹ Reading Soviet military journals leaves one with the impression that photo reconnaissance is the sole province of aircraft however, it seems likely that army level commanders also get data from satellite photography as well. But this satellite-derived data may not pass below army level because of security restrictions; a common problem in disseminating any type of information within the Soviet armed forces. It further seems likely that ground reconnaissance units try to take pictures of captured enemy equipment and of installations spotted in behind-the-lines actions.

Planning Operations

Combat reconnaissance activities are planned and directed in a top down fashion, like much else in the Soviet military, from the army level down to company echelon. Nevertheless, lower level ground force commanders are also expected to show initiative in their areas of responsibility. The often repeated Soviet dictum regarding reconnaissance is that it is the duty of every com-

mander to collect adequate combat intelligence.

As a general rule, reconnaissance missions are conceived initially at the army level. Usually the army commander will

... a local commander is the only one who can ensure his combat intelligence is current with the battlefield situation in his zone.

personally determine what is of general interest, what information should be sought, and timeframe for the operation. Next, his chief of staff will refine these requirements somewhat and establish the sequence of their execution, select areas of front to receive reconnaissance, specify which units are to take part, and suggest appropriate equipment to execute the operation.

After the army chief of staff has made his decision, he turns operational planning over to the staff intelligence officer and the intelligence section.* This intelligence section is the principal architect of the combat intelligence plan and the agency responsible for drafting the necessary orders for lower echelon units. More specifically, the staff intelligence section coordinates the activities of field reconnaissance missions, verifies the execution of operations, combines information collected, and processes raw information into finished intelligence. The intelligence section of the army staff also interrogates enemy prisoners taken during raids and ambushes as well as reviews captured official documents and personal papers.

The actual reconnaissance plan is prepared for several days and is constructed in a series of

*Planning reconnaissance in force also requires the participation of the operations section of the army headquarters staff.

stages to cover the entire operation. The early phases of the plan are quite detailed, but the instructions become decreasingly specific in the later stages due to the difficulty in foreseeing all contingencies that can arise as the reconnaissance scenario unfolds. According to Soviet military authorities, the plan usually consists of:

objective, intelligence mission and areas of concentration of principal intelligence efforts, distribution of tasks among designated personnel and equipment, timetable of execution of measures, sequence and time of presentation of intelligence. A map on a scale of 1:100,000 or 1:200,00 with graphic representation of measures to be performed would be appended to the written plan.¹⁰

Soviet sources indicate that in World War II a defensive combat intelligence operation typically would cover 10-15 days, but there is no information on the exact length of operational planning for offensive actions. Nevertheless, Soviet writers do suggest that offensive situations are more fluid than defensive ones and hence must be planned for a shorter period of time.

While drawing up the combat intelligence strategy, the intelligence section also requests air photographic coverage of the areas of interest. This request would specify where the coverage was needed, delineate areas that demand only visual air reconnaissance and those requiring photographs, and the scale of the aerial photos. Additionally, the intelligence staff would tell the air reconnaissance specialists how many sets of finished photos they wish and the desired time of delivery.

The drafted orders, approved by either the army chief of staff or

by the army commanders, are issued to the appropriate divisions. This packet of orders contain instructions for information required, a mission timetable, and a list of the appropriate sequence of activities. Additionally, each packet of orders has a summary of the best existing intelligence assessments on the area of operations.

Divisional headquarters relay the combat intelligence plans and orders to battalion level which is the next major focus for controlling tactical intelligence collections activities.¹¹ The battalion commander will personally brief his reconnaissance troops on what is needed, their zones of operation, and the time frame of the action. The battalion commander additionally will coordinate the reconnaissance troops functions while carrying out their mission. This coordination is accomplished through radio communications.

Soviet military writings further indicate that battalion commanders are responsible for initiating local reconnaissance to stay on top of the combat situation, regardless of whether any large scale operation is ordered from above. As Soviet writers explain,

a local commander is the only one who can ensure his combat intelligence is current with the battlefield situation in his zone.

Problems in Carrying Out Missions

Even though the Soviets are well aware of the importance of reconnaissance their military literature indicates things do not always go smoothly. This literature reveals problems from the World War II era which writers fear can crop up again and difficulties that routinely arise in the course of peacetime training exercises since World War II.

One of the most frequently mentioned difficulties is the misuse of specialized reconnaissance troops. That is, some commanders have a tendency to use reconnaissance battalions and companies as if they were just another line unit with the consequence that intelligence gathering specialists are lost in larger numbers than necessary or are not available for reconnaissance operations due to their participation in the battle as standard combat or assault troops.

A closely related difficulty is a command and control problem associated with the deployment

of specialized reconnaissance formations. Due to a lack of proper timing for commencing an operation, or poor operational control from the commander, reconnaissance troops sometimes become enmeshed in fighting the main battle to the detriment of their intelligence gathering functions. Current Soviet training exercises constantly seek to overcome this type of command and control problem.

The lack of experience by battalion and company grade personnel and the difficulty in achieving adequate realism in peacetime training situations concern some senior Soviet military commentators. Today, with exception of soldiers serving in Afghanistan, the Soviet ground forces have no battalion or company grade personnel with any wartime experience in gathering and reporting combat intelligence data. They have tried to remedy this deficiency through training exercises, but this has not proven easy to accomplish. More specifically, some Soviet officers have complained that during practice exercises the troops are given all the information they require to carry out the exercise, more information in fact than they could acquire through reconnaissance in a real life situation. This in turn has the consequence of relieving combat intelligence personnel of any real responsibilities during practices. An additional drawback of exercises is that the troops are already familiar with the terrain as a result of past practice missions and so there is little need for reconnaissance of the ground.

Senior Soviet officers indicate that successful reconnaissance collection operations depend on a "commander's creativity, initiative, and inventiveness."¹² Therein lies a problem since most Soviet combat intelligence plans are highly structured by higher headquarters. This robs battalion



AT-5/Spandrel Anti-tank Guided Missile System. A variant of the armored reconnaissance vehicle. Photo from DIA-The Soviet Airborne Forces DDB-1110-2-82

and company level officers of the discretion necessary to show creativity and initiative. Even if higher headquarters did not seek strict command and control of battalion and company reconnaissance operations, there is reason to suspect the willingness and ability of junior officers to be inventive. That is, Soviet military writers have long complained about the ability of battalion and company grade officers to show initiative in any combat situations because of their indoctrination in following orders from above and in doing things by the book. Given this general lack of initiative, why should Soviet junior officers be any more creative in reconnaissance situations?

The fact that Soviet reconnaissance specialists have a well established body of doctrine to draw upon may constitute a problem in itself, particularly in unconventional actions like Afghanistan. Soviet writings on reconnaissance always depict a World War II type scenario with clearly delineated front and rear areas. The enemy is also easily discerned by their uniforms and because they employ military vehicles with conventional markings. This doctrine and scenarios are drilled into all reconnaissance troops and mission planners.

This training is valuable as long as the combat situation is along well recognized lines, but in the chaotic world of Afghanistan, there are no distinct lines nor are enemy soldiers easily recognizable. Soviet casualty rates due to ambushes and their lack of success in locating or subduing Afghan insurgents suggest that doctrine is not serving reconnaissance troops well. In fact, tight command and control of reconnaissance actions by higher headquarters, as required by doctrine, may be one of the major impediments to success.

Whether the Soviets can and

will change their doctrine as a result of lessons learned in Afghanistan remains to be seen. Traditionally, senior Soviet officers have displayed little flexibility, or interest, in radically revising doctrine. Soviet military writers wishing changes may also experience some official reluctance to publishing papers on conducting reconnaissance against guerrillas because of official unwillingness to admit the Soviets are encountering a "freedom fighter" kind of mass movement.

Conclusions

Understanding Soviet combat intelligence objectives and methods should help U.S. troops defeat Soviet collection activities if the United States and Soviet Union ever go to war. A few of the possible actions U.S. personnel might take to reduce the

...successful reconnaissance collection operations depend on a "commander's creativity, initiative, and inventiveness."

effectiveness of Soviet intelligence operations include:

- Observing communications security procedures (i.e., talking as little as possible and using only assigned codes) even when employing ground lines.
- Camouflaging all positions thoroughly.
- Being alert to possible ambushes, even in rear areas.
- Keeping any information of military value (e.g., names of units, number of casualties, rumors of imminent movements) out of personal letters which might fall into the hands of Soviet behind-

the-lines raiders.

Successfully neutralizing Soviet reconnaissance efforts can pay high dividends to U.S. troops. As Soviet Major General Gredasov reminds us, "A commander cannot count on success in combat if he has been unable to organize effective reconnaissance."¹³

Andrew W. Hull is a professional researcher with considerable experience studying Soviet military and defense policy. His articles have appeared in *Field Artillery Journal*, *Armor Magazine*, *Marine Corps Gazette*, and *Army R.D. & A.*

Footnotes

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Defector Possibilities— Past, Present, Future.

by Michael Evancevich

Defectors are like blood transfusions to intelligence organizations. They bring with them information of intelligence value that could provide their new country's national and military intelligence organizations with new insights, methods, and enable them to confirm or revise the threat picture posed by their former organizations. On the other hand, defectors could conceivably bring numerous problems. Defectors come in a wide variety. Their rationale for defection runs the gamut of negative/positive human motivations. Here are some reasons why defectors from Soviet Bloc countries come over to our side.

- They have come in contact with Western nations while travelling to other countries outside the Soviet Bloc, or were stationed in one of the numerous embassies/consulates in a diplomatic cover status. While in these situations, they come in contact with other cultures. After comparing with Soviet reality, they decide that life in the West is most beneficial to them and their families.

- They have been recruited or directed to work for a Western intelligence organization; or have been working over a long period of time and it's time to come in "from the cold." Their motivation for working for another intelligence organization could be that they were caught in an infraction of rules situation. These infractions cover moral and ethical standards that would cause their removal or imprisonment under the Soviet Bloc system. The potential defector/agent is then "convinced" that it is in his or

her best interests to serve as an agent of opposing loyalties.

- They are prime targets of the "greed syndrome." Even though Soviet KGB/GRU officers receive more pay and privileges than the ordinary Soviet citizen, the living standard of Western nations "opens their eyes" to possibilities of living standards unheard of in the Soviet Bloc nations. More money, homes, better education, freedom of movement, and less political involvement are some of the more convincing factors under consideration by the potential defector.

- Some defectors are "in trouble" for a variety of reasons with their bosses/leaders. Their days are "numbered." They realize this and decide to make contact with an appropriate Western intelligence agency to offer their services. Contact is in a clandestine mode, under very controlled circumstances. The potential defector "proves" his bona fides by working for that particular Western agency, providing information of value, which could, at a future date, provide the defector with a better life in his new country.

Defector revulsion with the Soviet system is a key motivating factor for defections from Soviet Bloc countries. Oleg Penkovsky, is a prime example. Penkovsky never fit the criteria established for defectors because he could not leave the Soviet control. He was convinced that the Soviet Union was not honest in its foreign policy views and was making plans that were detrimental to world peace and stability. He was a senior Soviet officer, raised and educated under the Soviet system, who should have been a

"model" Soviet citizen. He was instead condemned as a "traitor," tried, and executed in April 1963.

Lt. Viktor Belenko, the MIG-25 pilot who landed in Japan in September 1976, was another Soviet officer (Air Force) who was educated, politicized, and given the best the Soviet system had to offer. He went to the best schools and had better privileges and opportunities than the average Soviet citizen. Despite all of this, his career and privileges awarded by the Soviet system, he made plans to defect. He was disgusted with the reality of the Soviet system. He was intelligent enough to realize this and was aware of the danger he was in, but he managed to overcome these things. He landed his MIG-25 in Japan, and provided Western intelligence agencies with valuable information on the MIG-25 which was unknown at that time.

Strong anti-Soviet feelings are prime motivating factors in the trigger-mechanism of defection. The defector realizes that the Soviet regime, after 50 years, has not improved the living standards of the average Soviet citizen compared to that of a Western nation. It has not provided the basic freedoms to its citizen and has substituted propaganda for substance. The Soviet Union is a closed society, all information sources are controlled by the government, there is no toleration of dissidence, and the GULAG administration still flourishes. The potential defector realizes this and is stimulated toward changing his life and that of his family.

At the same time the above applies, defectors from Soviet

Bloc countries have to be viewed realistically. It is not unknown to Western intelligence agencies to receive defectors offering their services, but who are in reality not defectors. These defectors are Soviet KGB/GRU or other Soviet Bloc intelligence agents who attempt to appear as bona fide defectors, but whose purpose is to penetrate and deceive the Western intelligence service into believing their "story." This method is used because the Soviets believe that their agents would ultimately be employed by the U.S. government as consultants to various national/military intelligence agencies. They would in effect be "moles" appearing, on the surface, to be working for us, when in reality they are working for the Soviet intelligence service.

This same scenario could apply to bogus defectors from other Soviet Bloc countries as well. The search within the CIA for an alleged "mole" carried over for several years in the case of Yuri Nosenko and Golitsin. Nosenko was a key Soviet KGB intelligence officer who provided significant intelligence information to U.S. authorities on Soviet intelligence operations and operatives, plus some past Western intelligence operations that had gone astray.

When Golitsin defected, he provided information that aroused suspicions that Nosenko was not a defector, but a possible Soviet disinformation agent, sent to mislead and confuse U.S. intelligence agencies. This led to a search for the mysterious "mole" in the CIA, which impeded U.S. intelligence operations abroad for a long time. (Nosenko has since been cleared from this stigma after a long period of enforced confinement and interrogation.)

However, the "mole" issue is still in the back of many minds and is not entirely resolved. Nicolas Shadrin, a defector, was a captain of a Soviet naval des-

troyer. He had a good education and rose to a high rank at a young age. He was destined for a higher rank, but became disenchanted with the Soviet system. He planned his defection from Soviet control with meticulous care. He, his wife, and a Soviet naval seaman, crossed the Baltic by boat, and landed in Norway (the trip took three days under extremely dangerous conditions). The seaman was released to the Soviets upon landing in Norway. Shadrin was interviewed by Norwegian authorities and he requested that he and his wife be allowed to go to the United States. He went to the U.S. embassy in Oslo, was granted political asylum and flown to the U.S.


Shadrin was controlled by the CIA, FBI, and Naval intelligence for a few years. He worked for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and became an informer under U.S. intelligence direction. He convinced U.S. intelligence officials that if he were able to provide his superiors with significant information over a period of time, he would be promoted in the KGB hierarchy to a position in which he could control KGB counterintelligence operations in the U.S. Shadrin's help was a means of obtaining the services of a high Soviet KGB officer. Meetings were set up between the KGB officer and Shadrin; information was exchanged. (The Soviets were anxious to have Shadrin back into their hands, as he was a source of great embarrassment to them when he defected. His return would be a lesson to other potential defectors, that life in the U.S. was not that good.) The meetings occurred mainly in the U.S., but there were meetings abroad. Shadrin had meetings with his Soviet contacts and returned to normal duties. However, at a meeting in Vienna in December 1975, he went with a Soviet contact, never returned to his hotel and is still missing.

Shadrin was the apparent victim of foul play while being an informer. Shadrin is a prime example of the risks defectors take when they get involved in their old trade.

Over the years thousands have defected to various Western nations. During World War II, Vlasov, a Lt. Gen. captured by the Germans, was able to form an anti-Soviet Army consisting of approximately 300,000 former Soviet soldiers captured by the German Army. After World War II ended, defections/desertions still continued and hundreds, if not thousands, of nationals from the Soviet Union/Soviet Bloc decided to leave their homelands for a better life. Defector possibilities from the Soviet Union and Bloc countries are still significant because the Soviet system has not changed to any significant degree. Force is used to stifle opposition; basic freedoms are non-existent; economic planning is in a shambles and the only strong thrust they have made is in the development of military technological applications. Within this framework, a source of military political/intelligence defections is assured. The fact that the Soviet government has been attempting to establish its bona fides and credibility to the world for the last 50 years without much success, speaks for itself.

Mr. Michael Evancevich served as an intelligence analyst for 15 years. He has had assignments with MI in psychological operations, order of battle, civil affairs and personnel security. He has an AA and has completed the Intelligence Analyst Senior Intelligence NCO Course and is currently working on the Basic Military Intelligence Officer's Intelligence Course. He works for Department of Army as a system coordinator.


Defection: a two-edged sword



OPFOR 83 Training Scheduler


Intelligence training is a major challenge to S2 and G2 personnel - a challenge which is being met by astute intelligence personnel and training managers at all levels of command. These personnel must insure that intelligence in command post and field training exercises continues to be accurately portrayed. The result will be competitive training which provides combat realism.

This training scheduler is an effort to provide information of this type to unit intelligence officers and training managers. Your comments on its usefulness and suggestions for its continuation are invited. Please forward your comments to Commander US Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613. Or if more convenient, call the Training Hotline Code-a-phone: AUTOVON 879-3609.



Sidney T. Weinstein
Brigadier General, USA
Commanding

FROG-7/ARTILLERY



To meet the demands of modern combat, Soviet artillery is shedding its "set-piece" character and taking on a dynamic new nature - OPFOR portrayal should depict mobile artillery weapons executing short, intensive fire strikes against mobile "hard" targets. Emphasis is on improved first-round accuracy, reduced mission time, and greater volume of fire on targets.

FROG-7 (Free-rocket-over-ground) is a tactical surface-to-surface missile found at division level. The transporter vehicle is the ZIL-135 wheeled prime mover, equipped with an on-board crane for rapid reloading. Large numbers of the FROG-7 are found in use throughout the Warsaw Pact and North Korea.



ЯНВАРЬ
JANUARY

1 NEW YEAR'S DAY
2 JANUARY 1st
3 JANUARY 2nd
4 JANUARY 3rd
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30 JANUARY 29th
31 JANUARY 30th

FROG-7 CHARACTERISTICS:

Launch Weight 2,500 kg
Length 9.0 m
Max Effective Range 70 km
Warhead High explosive (HE), Nuclear or Chemical

* DA POLICY: CIBS AT ALL LEVELS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PLANNING, CONDUCTING, AND CONTROLLING COMBAT. * THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR ELEC-
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SIGNALS INCLUDING HAND AND ARM SIGNALS, FLAG, PYROTECHNICS AND SMOKE IN COMBAT
AREAS. * FIRE BACK: AN ARTILLERY AMBUSH. * THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR ELEC-

OPFOR
83

TRONIC WARFARE CAPABILITIES INTO AN INTEGRATED SYSTEM CALLED RADIO ELECTRONIC COM-
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AREAS. * FIRE BACK: AN ARTILLERY AMBUSH. * THE SOVIETS HAVE DEVELOPED THEIR ELEC-

Notes:

SU-17/ FITTER-D



The size of the Frontal Aviation forces, together with their equipment and the command structure under which they operate, are indicative of the importance which the Soviets attach to close cooperation between air and ground forces in the land battle, and emphasises the doctrinal principle of "all arms coordination" as the key to success in modern warfare.



SU-17 is a single seat, attack and close air support fighter bomber, delivered in 1970. A prominent feature on the SU-17 is the swing-wing. Included into the SU-17 are the SRD-5M radar, an ASP-5ND fire control system, comprehensive communications, and IFF systems.



ФЕВРАЛЬ FEBRUARY

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20	21	22	25	26
27	28			

SU-17 CHARACTERISTICS:

Dimensions:	Wing Span: (28 degree) 14. m
	Length incl probe: 18.7 m
	Height: 4.7 m
Weight:	Empty: 10,000 kg
	Loaded: 14,000 kg
	Max: 19,000 kg
Performance:	1284 km/h; Mach 1.05
Armament:	Two 30mm NR 30 Cannon




* EACH PLATOON OF A SOVIET MOTORIZED COMPANY HAS ONE SCHOOL TRAINED SNIPER WITH A SVD SNIPER RIFLE. * GENERAL SUPPORT: IS PROVIDED BY ARTILLERY UNITS UNDER THE BANKING ARTILLERY COMMANDER. * SOVIET FRONTAL PURSUIT OF A WITHDRAWING ENEMY FORCE IS MANEUVER UNIT COMMANDER. * SOVIET FRONTAL PURSUIT OF A WITHDRAWING ENEMY FORCE IS

OPFOR
83

MOST LIKELY TO OCCUR AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF AN ENEMY WITHDRAWAL. AT NIGHT, IN DIFFICULT TERRAIN, OR WHEN OVERCOMING OBSTACLES. * A TYPICAL DROP-ZONE FOR A SOVIET AIRBORNE REGIMENTAL OPERATION IS 3 x 4 KM. * IN AN ATTACK FROM THE MARCH AGAINST A DEFENDING ENEMY THE SOVIET MRR WILL HAVE A FRONTAGE OF 4 TO 6 KM. * OPFOR (OPPOSING FORCES).

Notes:

BTR-60 PB/MOTORIZED BTR-70/RIFLE TROOPS



MARCH

	1	2	3	4	5
6	7	8	9	10	11
13	14	15	16	17	18
20	21	22	23	24	25
27	28	29	30	31	26
International THEATER DAY	Ministry of Defense was created in 1946	International WOMENS DAY	Stalin died in 1953	12	19
				Peace Treaty between Finland & USSR signed in 1940	26

The motorized rifle company is organized, trained and equipped primarily for a war of rapid movement and short duration. Maneuver during tactical operations is restricted to well-rehearsed combat formations and is often dictated by higher authority.

BTR-60 PB is a versatile amphibious vehicle, with good cross country and high road-speed capabilities. It has an armored roof and a turret which is identified as belonging to the BRDM-2.

BTR-70 is very similar to the BTR-60, and is probably its replacement. One specific feature that distinguishes the BTR-70 from the previous model is its splashboard, which folds on top of the bow. This is unlike the BTR-60 PB, which folds underneath the bow.

BTR-60 PB & BTR-70 CHARACTERISTICS:

Crew/Passengers:	3 + 8	2 + 10
Weight:	10.2 mt	12. mt
Length:	7.2 m	8. m
Width:	2.8 m	2.2 m
Speed:		
Road:	80 km	80 km
Water:	10 km	10 km
	BTR-60 PB	BTR-70

• THE BMP SQUAD EXITS THROUGH THE REAR DOOR OF THE VEHICLE. • THE SCUD-B HAS AN APPROXIMATE RANGE OF 280 KM. IT IS PRIMARILY USED FOR TACTICAL NUCLEAR OPERATION AT ARMY LEVEL. • OPPOSING FORCE: AN ORGANIZED FORCE CREATED BY AND FROM US ARMY UNITS TO FORTIFY AN APPROPRIATELY SIZED UNIT OF A POTENTIAL ADVERSARY ARMED FORCE. • THE 800 PM

OPFOR
83

AUTOMATIC PISTOL IS THE STANDARD SIDEARM FOR SOVIET OFFICERS. • SOVIET GROUND ATTACK FIGHTER AIRCRAFT ARE DEPLOYED AT WIDELY DISPERSED AIRFIELDS. THE AIRFIELDS WILL BE 35 TO 55 MM BEHIND FRONT LINES • HASTY ATTACK (QUICK ATTACK): IS MOUNTED FROM THE MARCH, AGAINST A BLUE FORCE UNIT OCCUPYING DEFENSIVE POSITIONS WITH BOTH CAMO & COVER.

Notes:

The BMP is a fully armored amphibious infantry combat vehicle (ICV). This ICV has excellent cross country capability and has become the basis for a family of variants which perform other roles.

Recognition features:

Centrally mounted turret except for the BMP M-1976; Six road wheels; Three track rollers; Two bulging doors for entry/exit in the rear.

BMP M-1981 CHARACTERISTICS

This ICV can be expected to support the BMP-1 in the motorized rifle units.

Noticeable features in particular are the new 30mm automatic cannon, and an additional machinegun firing port in the bow of the vehicle forward of the turret.

The skirts covering the support rollers are smooth and don't show the typical square patterning of skirts on the BMP.


DIVIDED INTO 16 MILITARY DISTRICTS AND HAS 4 GROUPS OF FORCES TO SUPPORT THE WARSAW PACT. • THE SAGGER IS RELOADED FROM THE OUTSIDE OF THE BMD-1. • TROOPS CAN FIRE THEIR INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS THROUGH THE FIRING PORTS IN SOVIET HELICOPTERS. • THE SCUD-B MISSILE IS CAPABLE OF MOUNTING A NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL OR CONVENTIONAL HE WARHEAD.

OPFOR
83

• NORTH KOREAN FORCES ARE INFANTRY HEAVY AND HIGHLY FOOT MOBILE. • SOVIET MILITARY COMMANDS DISTINGUISH 9 DIFFERENT TYPES OF HIGHWAY BRIDGES, ROADWAY WIDTH, LENGTH, AND HEIGHT ABOVE WATER LEVEL. • THE FROG-7 PROVIDES TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AT DIVISION LEVEL. • SOVIET INFANTRY ARE TRAIN TO FIRE FROM THEIR JEeps. • THE SOVIET UNION IS

Notes:

MI-24 / FRONTAL AVIATION HIND E



MAY
MAY

1 International WORKERS DAY	2 MAY DAY (Cont'd)	3	4	5 PRESS DAY	6	7 RADIO DAY
8	9 VICTORY DAY (V-E DAY)	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19 FOUNDING DAY OF THE RUSSIAN PEOPLES	20	21
22	23	24	25 AFRICAN LIBERATION DAY	26 Arm Agreement between USA & USSR signed in 1972	27	28 BORDER GUARDS DAY
29	30 CHEMISTS DAY	31				

MI-24 HIND E CHARACTERISTICS: *EST

- *Height: 4.25 m
- *Length: 17.0 m
- *Weight: 10,000 kg
- *Armament: One 4 barrel 12.7 Gatling gun,
Four 32 shot 57mm rocket pod,
Four Anti-tank missiles

The primary role of this arm is the air support of the ground forces, for which it is equipped with fighters to provide counter air operations (to gain and maintain local air superiority); ground-attack aircraft for close air support; strike aircraft for interdiction missions; photographic and radar reconnaissance aircraft; tactical transports and helicopters to provide air mobility for ground forces; armed helicopters for employment in anti-armor and ATGM destruction and suppression; and ECM aircraft for operations in the battle area.

MI-24 Hind E is an assault gunship helicopter, basically identical to the Hind D. A noticeable difference is that the Hind E has four laser-guided, tube-launched, anti-tank missiles designated by NATO as "SPRAL", rather than the Hind D's "SWATTER." Also, structural hardening by substituting steel and titanium for aluminum in crucial components is believed to have occurred.

NUMBERS ON THE BUMPER. * POTENTIAL ADVERSARY: ANY FOREIGN NATION WHOSE ACTIVITIES OR STRATEGIC INTEREST SUGGEST THAT THEY COULD CHALLENGE THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE USA. * THE SOVIET UNION HAS 126 MRDs, 47 TDs, AND 8 AIRBORNE DIVISIONS. * THE AIR DEFENSE ASSETS OF A SOVIET MAIR ARE DEPLOYED TO PROVIDE A 360 DEGREE AREA OF COVERAGE.

OPFOR
83

* THE SVD SNIPER RIFLE FIRES A 7.62 x 54mm CARTRIDGE. IT WILL NOT FIRE THE SMALLER AKM OR AK 47. 7.62 x 39mm ROUNDS. * THE SOVIET BELIEVE THAT A SUCCESSFUL PURSUIT GOAL, WILL RESULT IN THE DESTRUCTION OR NEUTRALIZATION OF A WITHDRAWING ENEMY. * ALL SOVIET VEHICLES OF A GIVEN TYPE WITHIN A PARTICULAR UNIT WILL HAVE CONSECUTIVE REGISTRATION

Notes:

CONVERSION FORMULAS

LENGTH

Metric to US units

Millimeters $\times 0.03937$ = inches (in)

Millimeters $\times 0.00328$ = feet (ft)

Millimeters $\times 0.00109$ = yards (yd)

Centimeters $\times 0.3937$ = inches

Centimeters $\times 0.0328$ = feet

Centimeters $\times 0.0109$ = yards

Meters $\times 39.37$ = inches

Meters $\times 3.281$ = feet

Meters $\times 1.094$ = yards

Meters $\times 0.00062$ = miles

Kilometers $\times 3280.84$ = feet

Kilometers $\times 1093.61$ = yards

Kilometers $\times 0.621$ = miles

AREA

Metric to US units

Square millimeters $\times 0.00155$ = square inches (in²)

Square centimeters $\times 0.155$ = square inches

Square meters $\times 1550.000$ = square inches

Square meters $\times 10.764$ = square feet (ft²)

Square meters $\times 1.196$ = square yards (yd²)

Square kilometers $\times 0.386$ = square miles

VOLUME

Metric to US units

Cubic centimeters $\times 0.061$ = cubic inches (in³)

Cubic meters $\times 35.31$ = cubic feet (ft³)

Cubic meters $\times 1.308$ = cubic feet (ft³)

Cubic meters $\times 1.308$ = cubic yards (yd³)

Liters $\times 61.02$ = cubic inches

Liters $\times 0.035$ = cubic feet

CAPACITY

Metric to US units

Milliliters $\times 0.271$ = fluid drams

Milliliters $\times 0.034$ = fluid ounces

Liters $\times 33.81$ = fluid ounces (oz)

Liters $\times 2.113$ = pints (pt)

Liters $\times 1.057$ = quarts (qt)

Liters $\times 0.264$ = gallons (gal)

WEIGHT

Metric to US units

Milligrams $\times 0.015$ = grains (gr)

Grams $\times 15.43$ = grains

Grams $\times 0.035$ = ounces

Grams $\times 0.0022$ = pounds

Kilograms $\times 2.205$ = pounds

Kilograms $\times 0.0011$ = short tons

Metric tons $\times 2204.62$ = pounds

Metric to US units

Centimeters/second $\times 0.033$ = feet/second

Meters/second $\times 3.281$ = feet/second

Meters/second $\times 196.85$ = feet/minute

Kilometers/hours $\times 0.621$ = miles/hours

PRESSURE

Metric to US units

Atmospheres (physical) $\times 14.70$ = pounds/square inch

Kilograms per square centimeter $\times 14.223$ = pounds per square inch

POWER

Metric to US units

Metric horsepower $\times 0.9863$ = US horsepower

Kilogram-meters $\times 7.233$ = foot-pounds

FUEL CONSUMPTION

Metric to US units

$\frac{235}{\text{Liters/100 kilometers}}$ = miles per gallon

TEMPERATURE

Metric to US units

9 Centigrade + 32 = degrees Fahrenheit

INTELLIGENCE IS FOR THE COMMANDER

IEWSPR 82

INTELLIGENCE ELECTRONIC WARFARE SYSTEM PROGRAM REVIEW

Summary

The Intelligence and Electronic Warfare System Review (IEWSPR) 82 was held 6 and 7 October at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. Hosted by USAICS, IEWSPR was the first such endeavor since the Intelligence System Program Review (INSRP) in 1978.

The IEWSPR brought more than 55 general officers and equivalent grade civilians together to review current and future IEW capabilities. This review is of critical importance to the Army. The evolution of the AirLand Battle places new and demanding requirements on IEW systems and personnel. The recommendations and actions resulting from IEWSPR 82 will go a long way toward ensuring commanders at all echelons have

the best IEW support possible to fight the AirLand Battle.

Those who attended the IEWSPR represented major Army commands and staff offices, the other services and the national intelligence agencies. Among the attendees were Gen. John A. Wickham, vice chief of staff of the Army, Mr. John McMahon, deputy director of the CIA, and Lt. Gen. Lincoln D. Faurer, director of the National Security Agency. Senior intelligence officers from the Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps also attended. These service and agency representatives presented base-line briefings outlining their agency's capabilities and how those capabilities can support the Army's IEW needs.

The three general officer panels, formed in April and charged with

assessing current and future IEW capabilities, presented their findings and made recommendations for improvements. Panel I looked at IEW from 1982 through 1985. The recommendations they made were aimed at immediately improving our current and near-term IEW capabilities. Panel II looked at the 1986 to 1990 time frame. The IEW Mission Area Analysis conducted by USAICS was used as a base document for identifying deficiencies. Panel III looked at the acquisition process of IEW equipment and made recommendations to make that process more timely, efficient and cost effective.

The results of the panels' efforts are in a draft Action Plan that was presented to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army following the presentations. The Action Plan lists specific panel recommendations by priority and tells which agency or office should be responsible for implementing that recommendation. The VCSA provided guidance for each recommendation. Based on that guidance, the Action Plan will go forward to various agencies for action.

The next issue of Military Intelligence Magazine will feature several articles on the conclusions and recommendations stemming from IEWSPR 82 and the findings of each panel.



IEWSPR 82 attendees get a first hand look at electronic warfare equipment. Receiving a briefing from a USAICS soldier are (from left) Brig. Gen. James A. Teal, FORSCOM, deputy chief of staff for intelligence, Dr. Richard L.





Haley, assistant deputy for Science and Technology for the deputy commanding general for RD&A at DARCOM, and Gen. Glen K. Otis, TRADOC commander. (U.S. Army photo)

Maj. Gen. James J. Rockwell, assistant deputy chief of staff for operations, Command, Control, Communications and Computers, takes a close look at the interior of a OV-1 Mohawk. (U.S. Army photo)



Initiative in the

Soviet Ground Forces



Shown above are some Soviet Ground Forces publications.

by Major Michael Hager

The appearance of FM 30-40 **Handbook of Soviet Ground Forces**, in 1975 and of numerous other publications about the Soviet soldier during the past decade reflects the concern of American Army planners that our military personnel be familiar with the training and character of their counterparts in the Soviet Ground Forces. FM 30-40 describes the repressive nature of Soviet army training and a resulting lack of initiative.¹ (For the purpose of this article "initiative" is to be taken in the American sense of "self-reliant enterprise" or "self-initiated activity" and not

in the Soviet sense of determination and perseverance.)² The Soviet Ground Forces anticipate the wide employment of maneuver and a more fluid and quickly shifting offensive.³ Clearly the success of such a doctrine will depend upon the initiative of combat commanders. In my opinion the lack of initiative reported in FM 30-40 must be reconsidered in view of recent developments in Soviet military training and experience.

Historically, the unquestioned centralism characteristic of Soviet society has been evident in its military system of command and control.⁴ This system has been described as a high state of discipline and blind obedience in which insubordination is the most serious offense.⁵ Since his military record is subject to disclosure to future civilian employers, the Soviet soldier is not expected to act in a way that may prejudice his future.⁶ At the command and planning levels the Soviets have used a rational approach to combat, believing that there is a correct solution for each combat situation.⁷ In an apparent attempt to avoid mistakes, the Soviets have planned exhaustively, issued detailed orders, proceeded cautiously, and tended to oversupervise.⁸ This obsession with planning can also be seen in Soviet military pedagogy of the early 1970s, which argues that training is "really valid when there is firm military order and precise and strict fulfillment of regulations, orders, manuals, and instructions."⁹ Training by rote has been emphasized in the belief that memory will suggest the proper course of action in combat.¹⁰

The result of this system has been inflexibility and lack of initiative: if combat followed a recognizable pattern, Soviet performance was well executed; the opposite was true in the absence of orders or a plan.¹¹ A Soviet soldier might follow his most recent order, however inappropriate to the situation.¹² A major source of such behavior is German observation of Soviet Army performance in World War II.¹³ The Germans observed a lack of initiative mainly in the echelons of command from company to division.¹⁴ They noted that the Soviets were unable to exploit successes or to perform well in counterattack or mobile operations.¹⁵ Small wonder that recent commentators have described

lack of initiative as the chief weakness of the Soviet Ground Forces.¹⁶

Certain developments in the Soviet military sectors have occurred which encourage initiative in the military environment. The civilian developments are educational and social. The major educational development is compulsory 10-year schooling, which became effective by 1970.¹⁷ As a result, the level of education of the Soviet soldier has risen—a feature noticeable as soon as 1969.¹⁸

In addition, the draft reform of 1967 revised the preinduction role of the Soviet high school, which now serves a role equivalent to American basic training.¹⁹ The social development has been the increasingly urban inductee base, leading to an increase in conscripts experienced in industrial skills.²⁰ This has been matched by increased preinduction, specialist training to supplement the "basic training" provided by high schools.²¹

Military specialists have actually increased from some 400 in 1950 to about 2,000 by 1972.²² Evidently the military, which receives the product of these developments, as personnel, can no longer be regarded as lacking in education or skills.²³

To assert that such developments cause a growth of independent thinking and a potentiality of initiative would be presumptuous. Nevertheless, they do foster confidence and self-reliance, and the present level of education and skill among Soviet military personnel must significantly reduce the need for initiative-destroying regimentation that formerly existed when military authority could not trust subordinates to understand complicated military planning or weaponry.

More significant are the developments which have taken place in the past decade within the Soviet military establishment, for

any external incentive to initiative cannot hope to prosper within the military sector unless the latter provides receptive soil. The major development is *edinonachalie* ("one-man command"), the increasing responsibility of unit commanders in both military and political affairs.²⁴

Although previously a Soviet commander may have escaped censure by strict adherence to rules, he is now personally accountable for mission execution.²⁵ Unlike the World War II experience, a unit commander need not defer to the political officer.²⁶ There is no longer any insurance in inflexible adherence to orders and rules; this is a potent incentive to commanders to be self-reliant and to exercise imagination and initiative.²⁷ The writer believes that the principle of *edinonachalie* has been adopted by the Soviets as a means of preparing unit commanders to cope successfully with the greater dispersion, independent operation of small units and mobility to be expected on the modern battlefield.

Another important development is the growth of Soviet military pedagogy. One important pedagogic source mentions the goal of instilling soldiers with creativity, initiative and independence.²⁸ Soviet officers learn that imagination is an essential element of military success, "a guarantee of initiative, and bold and confident action on the battlefield."²⁹ Discipline is no longer based upon fear but upon reasoned explanation to military personnel and the encouragement of self-discipline.³⁰ Such pedagogics may alarm conservative Soviet militarists³¹ but certainly encourage the growth of self-confidence, self-reliance and initiative.

The Soviets' recently revised concept of the offensive to involve flexibility of maneuver will require initiative. Soviet commanders at all levels must be

equipped not only to recognize a battlefield opportunity but to act promptly with imagination to exploit it. "Initiative" in such a sense has been seriously lacking in Soviet military performance, and modern Soviet planners must be aware of the need to remedy this weakness. Developments such as the change in offensive doctrine itself, *edinonachalie*, better educated military personnel, and the growth of concern in military pedagogy for imagination and initiative indicate a campaign to develop initiative and the probability of its success. Of course, the only valid test will be combat experience, and the Soviet performance in Afghanistan will have to be studied by the editors of FM 30-40.

Footnotes

1. **Handbook on Soviet Ground Forces**, FM 30-40 (30 June 1975), pages 3-3, 3-8, 3-10, 3-11, 3-12, 3-13, (hereinafter cited as "Handbook").
2. **Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary**, Springfield, Massachusetts, 1956 and 1979 eds.; Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "The 'Scientific' Soviet Commander," *Army*, June 1980, p. 40.
3. Colonel Graham D. Vernon, "Soviet Combat Operations in World War II: Lessons for Today?", *Military Review*, March 1980, p. 49; Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "U.S. Tactical Doctrine Plays Soviets' Game," *Army*, June 1981, pp. 57-59; "The Development of Soviet Motorized Infantry," *Military Review*, March 1981, pp. 76-77 (book review).
4. Scott, Harriet Fast and William F., **The Armed Forces of the USSR**, Boulder, Colorado 1979, p. 377.
5. Steve Abbott, "The Life of a Soviet Soldier," *Soldiers*, July 1980, p. 10; **Handbook**, pages 3-11.
6. **Handbook**, pages 3-3; John Erickson, "Soviet Military Performance: Some Manpower and Managerial Constraints," in **7th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium**,

- Garmisch, Germany, 1973, p. 43.
7. Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "The 'Scientific' Soviet Commander," *Army*, June 1980, p. 40.
8. Colonel Graham D. Vernon, "Soviet Combat Operations in World War II: Lessons for Today?", *Military Review*, March 1980, pp. 35-36; Captain Richard M. Saunders, "The Soviet Buildup: Why Does the Threat Grow?", *Military Review*, April 1980, p. 66; Malcolm Mackintosh, "Soviet Military Policy, 72-73," in **7th Annual Soviet Affairs Symposium**, Garmisch, Germany, 1973, pp. 3-4; **Handbook**, pages 3-12, 3-13.
9. Danchenko, A. M. and Vydrin, I. F., eds., **Military Pedagogy**, Moscow 1973 (USAF Soviet Military Thought NO. 7), p. 118.
10. Koslov, S. N., **The Officers Handbook**, Moscow 1971 (USAF Soviet Military Thought No. 13), p. 72.
11. **Handbook**, pages 3-10.
12. Steve Abbott, "The Life of a Soviet Soldier," *Soldiers*, July 1980, p. 10; **Handbook**, pages 3-10.
13. Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "The 'Scientific' Soviet Commander," *Army*, June 1980, p. 40; Colonel Graham D. Vernon, "Soviet Combat Operations in World War II: Lessons for Today?", *Military Review*, March 1980, pp. 30-40.
14. Colonel Graham D. Vernon, "Soviet Combat Operations in World War II: Lessons for Today?", *Military Review*, March 1980, pp. 33-36.
15. *Ibid*, pp. 44-45, 48.
16. *Ibid*, p. 39; **Handbook**, pages 3-13.
17. U.S. Department of State, **Background Notes: USSR**, February 1978.
18. **Handbook** pages 3-13; Danchenko, A.M. and Vydrin, I.F., op. cit., p. 130; U.S. Department of the Army, **Area Handbook for the Soviet Union**, DA Pam 550-95 GPO 1979, p. 589; John Erickson, op. cit., p. 18.
19. Smith, Hedrick, **The Russians**, New York 1977, p. 428.
20. William E. Odom, "The 'Militarization' of Soviet Society," **Problems of Communism**, Sept.-Oct. 1976, p. 34.
21. *Ibid*; John Erickson, op. cit., pp. 17-18.
22. William E. Odom, op. cit.
23. John Erickson, op. cit., p. 14.
24. Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "The 'Scientific' Soviet Commander," *Army*, June 1980, p. 40; John Erickson, op. cit., p. 38.
25. Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "The 'Scientific' Soviet Commander",

- Department of the Army, **Area Handbook for the Soviet Union**, DA Pam 550-95, GPO 1979, p. 596; John Erickson, op. cit., p. 38.
26. Department of the Army **Area Handbook for the Soviet Union**, DA Pam 550-95, GPO 1979, p. 596; John Erickson, op. cit., p. 38.
27. John Erickson, op. cit., 38; Lieutenant Colonel William P. Baxter, "U.S. Tactical Doctrine Plays Soviets' Game," *Army*, June 1981.
28. Danchenko, A.M. and Vydrin, I.F. eds., op. cit., pp. 118, 125, 129.
29. Koslov, S.N. ed., op. cit., p. 74.
30. **Handbook**, pages 3-11; Koslov, S.N. ed., op. cit., pp. 100, 103-104, 139. This approach to discipline may be intended to harmonize with the higher quality of education of the current inductee pool as well as a deliberate incentive to the exercise of initiative.
31. **Handbook**, pages 3-11.



Major Michael E. Hager, USAR, holds a MOBDES assignment at the Defense Investigative Service and previously was assigned to the 421st MI Detachment (Strategic) of Boston. After receiving his BA in history from Harvard in 1960, he attended Oxford University as a Fulbright scholar and graduated from Harvard Law School in 1964. In civilian life he is a trial attorney and partner in a Boston law firm. Hager is branch qualified and has completed Command and General Staff College.



Tanks lead OPFOR attack over open terrain. (Photo courtesy of Colorado Sun Newspaper) (See page 16)



SHARM EL SHEIKH, THE SINAI PENINSULA

by SSgt. Carl G. Wells

The stage was set for the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry's mission to the Sinai in April of 1979 with the acceptance of the Camp David Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt.

One of the principles of the treaty was that American troops would be stationed at the Straits of Tiran to ensure the freedom of navigation through strategic waters. These troops would be part of a Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) that would monitor the adherence to the Treaty of Peace by both parties. The treaty divides the Sinai into four zones from west to east. The MFO would monitor the level of military strength in these zones.

In Zone A, along the Gulf of Suez, north to the Mediterranean, the Egyptians are allowed one mechanized infantry division with a specified number of armored personnel carriers, tanks, artillery and air defense artillery pieces. In Zone B, which constitutes the central portion of the Sinai, four border/frontier battalions equipped with only light weapons and wheeled vehicles are allowed. In Zone C, in which the MFO actually oper-

Above. The evening patrol departs at Ending Nautical Twilight (ENT) from checkpoint 3C near Sharm el Sheikh, the Sinai Peninsula. (U.S. Army photo by MSgt. Ron McCumber)

ates, only civilian police are allowed. Zone D is the first two miles of Israeli territory. The Israelis are allowed to have four light infantry battalions in their zone.

The MFO has the mission to observe and confirm strengths in the various zones. The responsibilities for this are divided between the civilian observers and the force. The civilian observers are, for the most part, veterans of the United States Sinai Field Mission, the predecessor of the MFO. Their primary responsibility is for Zones A, B, and D. The force maintains operations in Zone C and the Straits of Tiran and is also tasked with being able to patrol and verify in the other zones on order.

Most of this passed with little comment until the summer of 1981. As early as July, speculation began on who would be chosen for the first deployment of American troops to the Middle East in many years.

As part of the Rapid Deploy-

ment Force's keystone 82nd Airborne Division, the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry has always been ready for no-notice deployment overseas; but, in this instance, the 18-hour deployment sequence was to take almost six months.

In late September, Lt. Col. William F. Garrison, battalion commander, called a battalion formation in Fort Bragg's Alvin C. York Theater. The group of paratroopers were perfectly still as the mission was announced to them with the words: "Some people read about history, some people get to make it."

Now that the wraps were officially off the mission, the staff planning sequence began. The S2, realizing the importance of intelligence that could and would have to be provided, immediately began to tap the resources that abound on Fort Bragg. It was soon discovered that the southern Sinai is one of the less written about areas in the world.

Most studies of the area dated back to the 1950s or before. With one light infantry battalion being assigned to cover an area of over 4,000 square miles, all available information that could be requested, begged, borrowed or

otherwise obtained could not be ignored.

It was quickly ascertained that the South Sinai was probably not the lost Garden of Eden. It is a very arid region known for the stark beauty of its steep mountains, little vegetation and even less precipitation combined with oven-like temperatures.

During Israeli occupation, the area became a thriving tourist attraction with some agricultural assets. It was also a haven for the "flower children" of the past decade. They shared this land with a population of approximately 3,000 Bedouin nomads. The nomads could be considered the true owners of the Sinai; they have watched conquering armies come and go since before the time of Christ.

The mission of the battalion given by MFO was: To be present,

which would provide a deterrent to violations of the treaty; to observe and report violations of the Treaty of Peace between the two countries; and to maintain freedom of navigation of the Straits of Tiran.

This mission is being accomplished by the positioning of a series of Observation Posts on the border along Zone B and in Zone C, along the border of Israel and along the coast of the Gulf of Aquab. Check Points were set up at specified points on the international frontier between Israel and Egypt and on the boundaries with Zone A and B. CPs serve the dual role of monitoring traffic in and out of Zone C and acting as a customs point for MFO personnel passing out of Zone C. According to the protocol agreement, MFO personnel "police" themselves in most matters.

With this statement of mission, the need for a pre-deployment training program was clear.


Operating in squad-size elements over such a vast area, all members of the battalion would be required to be intimately familiar with more than just their standard Skill Qualification Test tasks. Desert survival, land navigation, local customs and culture, along with Arabic language, became more than just items on a training schedule.

The special challenge to this training program was that all troopers involved realized that even the most junior soldier may need this knowledge for the survival of his unit; not just to make sure he could receive a "Go" in a round-robin test.

The S2 supported this effort by providing coordination and direct support for language, customs and courtesies, vehicle and aircraft recognition peculiar to that part of the world, along with the normal S2 related subjects. Officer and NCO classes were conducted in addition to the regular training schedule. For these, outside instructors were often brought in to provide a wider breadth of instruction.

All available time was used in the presentation of this material. The battalion had been relieved of all post and division support details. The S2 was able to develop the reputation of being able to deliver a class with minimum notice. This type of training should not be ignored. It enabled the S2 to provide current updates and reinforce previous training.

The highlight of this program was a three-day field training exercise prior to deployment. OP and CP positions conducted simulated reports and searches. Arab




◀ Multinational force and observers zones (MFO) were established by the Camp David Treaty of Peace in 1979. Zone A - Gulf of Suez; Zone B - Central portion of the Sinai; Zone C - Strait of Tiran, and where the MFO actually operates; Zone D - the first 2 miles of Israeli territory.

linguists ranged through the exercise area in native dress lending a realistic flair to the exercise. They were able to provide the troopers valuable experience in dealing with people who do/will not speak English.

This training continued right up to deployment and during the acclimatization period in the country. Upon arrival, the training received an additional benefit from the troopers being able to see the equipment they would be required to report before the changeover actually occurred.

Because of the sensitivity of the mission, restrictions were placed on the forces. The S2 was affected because there was to be no military intelligence in the MFO. This was to be handled by a chief of military information. Therefore, all MI personnel became information personnel. This occasionally caused some confusion between the S2 and the Public Affairs Office. Also, MFO units could not use secure communications. All radio and radio teletype had to be sent in the clear. This was to later give way to some low level jamming and harassment of communications.

Early on in the planning phases, it was recognized that the TOE S2 shop would require augmentation to achieve the level of production volume required for the mission. Two intelligence analysts and four linguists provided the necessary additional personnel required for the training phase. The battalion deployed with what some call a "heavy" S2 or the very provisional 505th Military Information Detachment. In contrast with a normal five-man operation, over 26 personnel were deployed with the S2: One additional intelligence analyst, four linguists, a 12-man ground surveillance radar squad, and the battalion chaplain and his assistant for good luck. In addition to the CP and OP, the MFO requires mounted patrols throughout the zone weekly. This is accom-



SSgt. Carl G. Wells debriefs a platoon leader in Sector C of the Sinai Peninsula. (U.S. Army photo by MSgt. Ron McCumber)

plished by vehicle mounted patrols in each company sector. These differ from normal concealed reconnaissance patrol operations in that they are to be visibly present. This has to be done without completely sacrificing operational security or setting up an obvious pattern of patrols. Thus, hard and fast patrol routes are not required by the S2. Each company sector is divided into patrol areas. Overlays are provided to the companies showing patrol areas by depicting the major avenues of approach to them.

Each platoon and squad leader is then able to select their own exact route, intermediate CPs and timetable. Since each platoon and squad, by nature, has its own way of doing it, OPSEC is provided for. Patrols are required to submit a written report within 48-hours of completion.

Face to face debriefs are often impossible until the company has rotated back to the Sharm el Sheikh base camp because of the distances involved. In this unique mission, the standard NATO debrief/report format is not used. The S2 has developed a special format based on MFO information requirements and battalion EEI/OIR. These reports serve to substantiate Egyptian locations, qualify trafficability in remote areas; account for the Bedouin population and enable the battalion to acquire knowledge of the whereabouts of the rare natural fresh water supplies.

At noon on April 25, the official turnover of the Sinai took place. All of the months of preparation began to pay off. The first few weeks of Egyptian control were a test for the S2, as all Egyptian civilian police in the battalion sector were located and accounted for. This was to prove to be a continual challenge as more troops were brought in and

locations changed. Paratroops were confused at first by the sight of the Egyptian police. Accustomed to American police, the sight of police carrying AK-47 rifles, helmets, and a very military-like uniform rang an alarm bell in their minds. Within the first week, there were no less than five different police organizations operating in Zone C.

Though their uniforms were similar, each had their own distinctive brassard and other uniform accouterments. At first, this caused a nightmare in reporting until the difference between police and army uniforms and the differences in the different police uniforms could be put out to the troops in the field.

Reporting times were also critical. MFO imposed a requirement of reporting in 15 minutes suspected violations and overflights. If not for the dedicated performance of the battalion communications platoon, this would not have been possible.

The myriad of sophisticated microwave communications equipment did not arrive until after operations were well under way. Until that time, the battalion was completely dependent upon organic FM communications bolstered by Dutch-operated AM assets. Some difficulties were encountered by jamming of both the AM and FM frequencies at random times.

In spite of all of these difficul-

ties, in a communications exercise conducted five days prior to mission assumption, the 1/505th bested all competition in the speed that reports were forwarded from the OP/CPs to MFO Headquarters.

One of the most critical parts of the mission is the monitoring of the Straits of Tiran. The straits are a narrow body of water which channelizes all shipping coming into southern Israel and Jordan. The closing of the straits heralded the beginnings of past Arab-Israeli conflicts. Originally, the islands in the straits belonged to Saudi Arabia, with Egypt laying claim to them. However, they have been under Israeli occupation and administration since the 1967 war.

As mentioned earlier, these are some of the reasons behind the decision that American troops were needed to keep the straits open. This was accomplished in three ways. The first is an ongoing patrol by a Coastal Patrol Unit composed of three Italian navy minesweepers. The CPU patrols up and down the coast on a varying schedule during both day and night hours. Two OPs also monitor the strategic straits on a 24-hour basis.

At one OP, a squad from Company B, 313th MI Battalion uses ground surveillance radar equipment to monitor ship traffic and movement within the straits during the hours of darkness. The

PPS-5 radar system has proven to be effective with its 10 kilometer range. Its performance in varying weather conditions has also proven highly satisfactory.

A liaison with the relieving unit, a battalion of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), was established at the earliest possible time. This was accomplished by the placement of an LNO in the unit before deployment. This early placement provided the relieving unit with an almost play-by-play account of difficulties encountered by the battalion from the outset. This was continued after the LNO's return through correspondence and distribution of reports to the relieving unit.

This deployment has proven the immeasurable value that aggressive tactical intelligence can play in the success of any mission. The 1st Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry is just the first of a series of units to be involved in this mission in the years to come. The successful operation of any battalion in this environment will depend upon the predeployment training, planning and operations of its S2 section.

SSgt. Carl G. Wells joined the Army in 1979. He was assigned to the 313th Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence Battalion as an All Source Analyst. He is currently assigned as the Battlefield Intelligence Command Center (BICC) NCO for the 1st Battalion (Airborne), 505th Infantry.

How many?



THE ZAMPOLIT

To its followers, communism is not only attainable but inevitable. According to Marxist-Leninist gospel, when achieved, communism will be the final step in man's development. Hence, the ultimate goal of the Communist Party is attainment of this state of heaven on earth. But even though foreordained, "scientifically" provable, and just around the corner, this process will not take place by itself. Guiding, directing, inspiring, and most of all, controlling this phenomenon is thus the role of the party.

by Major Wayne Silkett

So it is that in the Soviet Union, the Communist Party is everything and everywhere. And nowhere is this comprehensive presence more important than in the Soviet armed forces.

To insure control over the armed forces, the party has not only thoroughly politicized them, but has made them subject to a withering array of overlapping, redundant, and often competing agencies, all dedicated to advancing the aims of the party. For the armed forces, this means compliance, conformity, and political reliability are not merely expected but demanded.

Foremost of these control agents is the Main Political Administration, the MPA, highest political organ in the armed forces and part of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party. The MPA provides a large, extremely influential, and separate corps of officers to the Soviet military establishment. These deputy commanders for political affairs, or zampolit (zamestitel' komandira po politicheskoi chasti) officers, are found in all five Soviet branches of service—strategic rocket, ground, air defense, air, and naval forces—from company or equivalent level

upward. They work with the armed forces but not truly for them. They work for the Communist Party. And since they are in the political directorate, zampolit officers have their own chain of command, schools, and career paths.

Zampolit officers are fundamentally responsible for the political reliability of the armed forces. They accomplish this by a combination of personal presence and comprehensive political programs, right down to company level.

Support of Combat Readiness

The Commander-zampolit relationship is not necessarily an adversary one. Each officer has his respective role and responsibilities and both are expected to work together to harmonize military and political requirements and goals. Toward this goal of mutual compatibility, it is up to the zampolit to point out commonality in military and political interest.*

Some of the zampolit's specific combat readiness support functions involve morale and discipline. Personal and moral problems often come first to the attention of the zampolit. In the area of unit discipline, the zam-

polit assists the commander in determining the state of unit discipline, sources of disciplinary violations, and providing a program for improvement. The zampolit's moral responsibilities include monitoring troop living counseling, promoting unit solidarity, and dealing with alcoholism and ethnic conflict.

Ideological-political Training

The zampolit's political work includes comprehensive political training for all unit officers, non-commissioned officers, and conscripts. He is responsible for unit propaganda activities as well as unit cultural and recreational programs. The zampolit also organizes political training, social, and recreational activities for the wives and families of officers and noncommissioned officers.

Military Education

Besides political training, the zampolit has a significant role in all other unit training. His participation insures a suitable integration of political and combat inputs. He also mobilizes all party and KOMSOMOL (communist youth league) members and activities in support of training and combat readiness.

An important feature of Soviet

*The relationship between commanders and political officers has not always been satisfactory. Both Trotsky in the 1920's and Marshal Zhukov in the 1950's sought to place military professionalism above

political work. Both failed and as a result, political control over the armed forces increased. Essential conflicts between military and political goals have been recognized, however, and zampolit training

now produces a political officer much better qualified, technically and tactically, than his predecessors. This has improved the commander-zampolit relationship more than anything else.

military training is "socialist competition." This involves individuals and units competing in special training programs. Individuals who score high in these competitions are awarded proficiency badges and units scoring high receive distinctive titles (such as "Outstanding Artillery Battery" or "Outstanding Aircrew"). The political officer is very much involved in organizing these programs.

The zampolit is also responsible for the unit education program. A particularly important education emphasis in the Soviet armed forces is the Russian language. Because of the Soviet Union's great linguistic and ethnic diversity, large numbers of Soviet conscripts speak Russian poorly. This language training thus not only is of benefit to the armed forces but to the nation as well.

Strengthening Party Influence and the Role of Party Institutions

As a unit's senior party worker, the zampolit participates in all party activities. He coordinates a perpetual propaganda campaign, praising all aspects of party business, party work, and party goals.

Leadership of KOMSOMOL Organizations

One of the most important zampolit functions is leadership of the unit KOMSOMOL organization. The KOMSOMOL, the community youth league, is a training and development ground for future party members. Membership, though, as with party membership, is by no means easy or automatic. The zampolit is responsible for organizing and directing all KOMSOMOL activities, including recruitment, training, and general program development.

Recruitment and Training of Political Workers

Party work is not carried out

exclusively by KOMSOMOL and party members. The zampolit continually searches for those who can do political work even though they are not suitable for party membership.

Six Basic Tasks

- ☐ Support of combat readiness
- ☐ Ideological-political training
- ☐ Military education
- ☐ Strengthening party influence and the role of party institutions
- ☐ Recruitment and training of political workers

Zampolit Training

Zampolit training is not exclusively political and ideological. A significant portion of political officer training is technical and tactical according to the branch of service with which the zampolit will serve. Political training stresses political-ideological subjects and techniques of propaganda and indoctrination.

Most entry level zampolit training is conducted at one of nine political officer schools. Not all MPA officers begin their careers as zampolits. Many transfer to the MPA after initial training and service in one of the five basic branches of service. Others are assigned to the MPA from one of the basic branches, some temporarily and some permanently. Still others serve temporarily as political deputies but do not transfer to the MPA.

Career progression within the MPA is by branch of service affiliation. That is, the naval zampolit will serve exclusively with the navy, the ground forces zampolit with ground forces, and so on. Pay, allowances, and career patterns correspond to those of officers in the five branches of service.

Effectiveness

At no level can the work of the

MPA be dismissed as worthless. While the institution of political officer might well have no Western counterpart, as noted above, many of the zampolit's functions do. And if there is no need in Western armies for such concentrated political emphasis, this offers no ground for concluding on a mirror imaging basis that there is no Soviet need.

The MPA provides the Communist Party with one of several means of exercising over the armed forces the party's most critical requirement—control. By relieving commanders of the added burden of political work, zampolit officers insure party work is carried out and that the party's message is disseminated on a continual, consistent, and exclusive basis.

Because the MPA is a separate organization superimposed over the armed forces, its power and authority are extremely significant. Nowhere is the evidence of the MPA's importance more obvious than in its relationship with the officer corps in general. No Soviet officer can be given additional schooling or promoted without MPA validation of his political reliability.

Most western complaints about MPA effectiveness focus on the zampolit's usefulness at the lowest levels. High and rising levels of alcoholism, ethnic conflict, AWOL, theft, violence, shirking, and even defection suggest that party influence among conscripts is far from satisfactory. Although 10-15 percent of training time is devoted to political matters, there is evidence that this instruction is simply endured because there is no alternative.

Boring and repetitious that it might be, political training, by its continuous nature and approved content, serves, with regular military duties, to keep the Soviet conscript thoroughly occupied. With conscription a virtual certainty for every able-bodied Soviet male, this two to three

year term of military service is a tremendous opportunity for comprehensive political indoctrination. With almost no free time of his own, the conscript receives only that message the party wishes him to receive. Besides extolling Marxism-Leninism, one of the zampolit's major tasks is trying to offset the "corrosive" influence of the West, particularly Western youth culture (music, clothes, etc.).

Finally, the zampolit officer's constant presence, plus his influence in both unit party and KOMSOMOL organizations provide invaluable sources for monitoring real or potential disaffection or dissidence. As zampolits endlessly stress, the enemies of communism are everywhere.

Conclusions

Survival of the Soviet Communist Party is absolutely dependent upon the party's degree of control. In the armed forces, it is the Main Political Administration that is principally, although not exclusively, responsible for providing this control.

The zampolit plays an enormously important part in guaranteeing this control. The deputy commander for political affairs does not insure consistency, and continuity of the party's political message, although his job is much more than mere propaganda and slogans.

He is charged also with a major role in moral, discipline, training, and education. And he is the party's official functionary with the unit.

In recent years, zampolit training has stressed military professionalism so that today, the political officer has a better appreciation and understanding of the military side of national defense. This enables him to better focus his efforts toward a more effective integration of party and military requirements, in turn resulting in an improved working relationship between

commanders and political deputies.

The zampolit unquestionably serves an important purpose in the Soviet armed forces. He is the principal agent for party work at the unit level. He is also the critical link between the military and political sources of power. And he is a means of control.



Maj. Wayne A. Silkett holds a BA in History from San Jose University, an MA in Political Science from Boston University and an MA in International Relations from the University of Southern California. He was graduated from the Infantry Officers Candidate School in 1968 and has since attended the Infantry Officers Advanced Course, the Foreign Area Officers Course, the Defense Language Institute (Russian), the U.S. Army Russian Institute, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Silkett has served in Vietnam and Berlin and is currently an intelligence analyst, Warsaw Pact Ground Forces, with the Defense Intelligence Agency. His articles have appeared in *Army, Infantry, Review of Soviet Ground Forces and Military Intelligence*.

Professional Reader


Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army by David C. Isby. Jane's. 1981. 384 pages. \$34.95.

Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, by David C. Isby is perhaps the finest source of unclassified Soviet Threat information available today under one cover. The author concentrates on discussing the capabilities of the weapons, organizations and tactics of the Soviet Ground Forces in depth and detail. Additionally, Isby includes in his book a comprehensive TO&E organization and Order of Battle (OB) section. Another key feature of this book is the excellent development of important components of the Soviet Army in separate chapters (i.e. C³, artillery, ADA, etc.).

This book is well-written and researched, supplemented by excellent graphics and photographs which tend to make difficult subjects easier to understand. The material covered within this book, while not all encompassing, is by far the very latest information available today at the unclassified level, making it a handy, ready reference document. ***Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army*** is an excellent source of information for the military enthusiast and one which belongs in the professional library of every military intelligence officer.

Albino S. Leal
CPT, MI
DOTD Threat Team

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) United States — Soviet Union



By Capt. Drusilla Brown

Psychological Operations (PSYOP) are defined as the planned use of propaganda and other related actions to further national objectives abroad. This article examines the potential role PSYOP can play in furthering the national interests of the United States within the Soviet Union.

It is assumed that, in the long run, democratization of the Soviet Union would be favorable to U.S. interests. It is not anticipated that PSYOP alone could achieve that goal, or even that democratization is possible. It is important to encourage trends in that direction and to work for increased cooperation and understanding whenever possible. It is also advantageous to encourage the Kremlin to look inward rather than allocate finite resources in support of destabilizing influences abroad.

The bulk of the United States' efforts to effect changes in Soviet attitudes and behavior is aimed at elite groups. The International Communications Agency concentrates on political leaders—the media, Academy of Sciences specialists, journalists, university specialists, economists and trade officials. However, other potential target audiences are being ignored.

It is the Soviet people, the ordinary citizens, who will determine the course of their own history. There is a good deal of evidence which contradicts the American perception that individuals (private citizens or large groups) in the Soviet Union have little impact on decision making.

Brezhnev has stressed the importance of social feedback. The amount of time and energy spent on Soviet propaganda and on insulating citizens from contact with the West indicates that the Kremlin is very concerned with what the masses are thinking. As authorities begin to realize that they are relatively ignor-

ant about popular perceptions, they have begun commissioning sociological research at the regional and local levels. Such research is intended to allow the leadership to better assess the limits on what they can get away with.

The government is also aware of the increasing ineffectiveness of its own propaganda. The growing demand for information (particularly on the part of the young) has created problems for domestic propaganda. People want to know more about everything from international relations to sex.


These demands are simply not being met. Better training and jobs demanding greater mental input have made people more selective about what information they retain. As people become more sophisticated, they are less likely to take propaganda at face value. It has become so pervasive that people are tuning it out.

Since Khrushchev, life in the Soviet Union has been relatively quiet and uneventful. This surface calm tends to obscure massive changes which are underway. Tension is building between the party and society. The party is losing control. There is enormous gap between the elite and the masses. Education, increased sophistication and the relaxation of Stalin's terror means many citizens are beginning to think for themselves.

Long-range economic objectives have not been reached and the unfilled demand for consumer goods has led to a general sense of dissatisfaction. People are no longer content to crowd several families into one apartment. Rapidly expanding urban populations are creating a housing crisis. The acquisition of basic necessities takes many hours each day. Absences, low productivity and poor workmanship are chronic problems. Alcoholism is a

national disease. Still the economy—through a thriving black market—is working.

The urban birth rate—particularly among ethnic Russians—has sharply declined. A terrible labor shortage in industrialized areas leaves the state in the position of desperately wanting more children. This gives a woman a strong bargaining position; however their ability to exert collective pressure is virtually nonexistent.



The non-Russian peoples—roughly half the total population and growing—pose an internal threat to the Soviet empire. High birth rates among these groups and virtually zero population growth in Russia means ethnic Russians will soon be in the minority. New elite groups have grown up among non-Russians. While they do not openly question the Soviet state, their primary loyalties lie with their own people. Modernization and education have brought out national pride and self-assertion. The Soviet leadership is faced with the same problems which eventually destroyed West European empires.

The average Soviet is proud to be a citizen of one of the world's two most powerful nations. They realize that good relations with the U.S. are vital. Although Americans are seen as exploitive and elitist, Soviets admire our con-

sumer goods and would like to get them. Besides, the Soviet system is seen as elitist as well. There is an insatiable curiosity about the U.S. because it is virtually inaccessible. There is a strong feeling that the two nations are natural allies who should work together for peace. America provides the only standard for comparison, but there is almost no knowledge about our political system, our social welfare system or daily life. Despite their fascination with America and widespread disillusion with the party, most Soviets are apolitical. They just want to make ends meet and get ahead.

Most Soviets are aware that their system has shortcomings but remain genuinely proud of their economic progress since World War II. There is a belief that, on the whole, society is serving its citizens reasonably well. Compared with the past, the communist regime is an improvement. While most people live without protest, important minorities create increasing problems of internal control.

Nationalism, regionalism and consumerism are all creating tensions within the Soviet Union. Although the people feel relatively well-off, a sense of malaise has set in. People know the state will provide whether they are productive or not, so they tend to drink heavily and malingering. Stealing from the state is not perceived as a crime, so many products find their way into the black market. Urbanites tend to look down on rural dwellers as peasants and those in rural areas resent city folk. Ethnic Russians feel they are threatened by rising birth rates among minorities and the minorities feel oppressed by the Russians.

Clearly, these internal tensions and changes present a variety of opportunities for successful PSYOP exploitation. Additionally, there are a number of mispercep-

tions about the U.S. which could well be cleared up. The remaining question is how to communicate with the general populace?

The ICA reports that the immediate effect in Afghanistan and Poland has been the suspension of a number of their programs. Voice of America local language broadcasts into the Soviet Union are being jammed with increasing regularity and effectiveness. However, it is believed that when these broadcasts do get through, they are widely listened to and are a vital source of information to Soviet society. Western sources have established a great deal of credibility for accurate and timely reporting. Many broadcasts are taped, especially by Soviet youths who enjoy western music.

Television is extremely popular and 74 out of every 100 Soviet families own a TV set. In the future, programs via satellite will be transmitted directly into private Soviet homes. The Kremlin has shown its concern over this possibility by working for an international convention to control information satellites.

American literature is also an important source of information about the U.S. Mark Twain and Ernest Hemingway are particular favorites. Many Soviets read insatiably. Western cultural exhibits routinely run out of available books to give away.

To some extent, America can simply force communication via satellite and radio despite Soviet jamming efforts. The black market facilitates dissemination of tapes and printed products. A PSYOP effort would be much more effective, however, if implemented within an overall process of reestablishing detente. If America were to move away from its current hardline approach to the Soviet Union and more towards the European approach of peaceful coexistence, then additional avenues for communication with Soviet citi-

zens would become available. Such a policy shift may not be possible or even desirable and is not essential for successful implementation of a PSYOP campaign.



Soviets have become sophisticated at recognizing propaganda and ignoring it. Although this is largely a result of heavy-handed domestic propaganda, the reaction is likely to be the same in response to similar propaganda from foreign sources. There are a number of factors which would actually facilitate an American PSYOP effort. First is the aforementioned curiosity Soviets have about the U.S. and its people. This would insure a fairly wide audience for printed materials, tapes, films, radio and television broadcasts which offer a glimpse into life on the other side of the Iron Curtain. The credibility Western news sources (such as VOA) have established puts them in a favorable light and enhances their usefulness for transmission of PSYOP themes. The sense that America and the Soviet Union are natural allies against China would help make communications from the U.S. more palatable.

Many special interest groups feel a special affinity for America. Intellectuals see it as a haven for creative thought. Religious groups look to America as the protector of religious freedoms. Moslem ethnic minorities feel a closer kinship to monotheistic

capitalism than they do to godless communism.

There are subjects which genuinely interest large segments of the Soviet population which are not being addressed domestically. Western materials and broadcasts which filled these vacuums by addressing such things as women's problems, sex, dating and current events within the Soviet Union would attract certain audiences.

The incredible resentments and schisms which have developed between various classes and nationalities make fertile ground for PSYOP aimed at destabilizing Soviet society and the empire as a whole. The relative merits of destabilization, however, would have to be closely examined.

The Soviet Union is at a crossroad. Strong forces are tearing at it from within. Both the economy and ethnic Russian supremacy face serious challenges. Even if fundamental reforms are made, there is no guarantee that either will withstand those challenges. For better or worse, demographic shifts and the increased sophistication of the people will reshape the empire. There is no guarantee that any amount of U.S. effort will insure that these inevitable changes will be in our best interest; yet there are trends which indicate that the Soviet Union could conceivably be headed in the direction of increased democratization. It may be that an increasingly well-educated population will take more and more control over its own destiny. Increased awareness about the U.S., its goals, policies and ideology could well lead towards increased rapport between the two nations. The Soviet public seems inclined to be more receptive towards the U.S. than hostile. Communications means are available and could become more so in an environment of relaxation of East-West tensions. Even the Soviet leadership seems to lend credence to the theory that

America could have a reasonable impact on its citizens and is going to great lengths to inhibit the communication process.

Exacerbating existing tensions within the Soviet Union could speed up the dissolution of the empire, but it could also evoke harsh reprisals against the very people with whom the U.S. would seek to develop increased rapport. Still, it is clearly in our best interests to develop closer ties with the people and future leaders of various segments of the Soviet empire (however, it may ultimately fragment itself).

The Kremlin's fear of rebellion and secession increases the likelihood that an American PSYOP effort could force the Soviet leadership to divert resources away from destabilizing exertions abroad and concentrate instead on domestic issues. At the very least, the Soviet people would become more knowledgeable about the U.S. and less likely to question America's genuine desire for peaceful coexistence.



Capt. Drusilla Brown is currently attending the MI Officers Advanced Course. She has attended the MI Officers Basic Course, the 35A Tactical Intelligence Course, and was graduated with honors from the Psychological Operations Officers Course and Foreign Area Officers Course. Brown's assignments include the Combined Forces Command in Korea and the 1st Psychological Operations Battalion where she wrote and edited strategic assessments for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Earlier this year, Brown served with the Combined German/U.S. Second Echelon Interdiction Study at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md. Brown holds a BA in Theater from New England College and has attended the Northeastern University Graduate Business School.

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Ethnic - Continued from page 13

Conclusion

Barring any unforeseen shifts in the direction of Soviet foreign policy, the Soviets will probably maintain their armed forces at current manpower levels. This will probably occur, in spite of the fact that the non-Slavic conscript pool is expected to exceed one-third of the total by 1985. Simultaneously, the armed forces will continue to become more technologically sophisticated.

Language barriers and generally inferior educational backgrounds of some minorities will make training increasingly difficult. As the number of non-Slavic soldiers increase, their combined strength, and fiercely nationalistic sentiments, could combine to cause exponential increases in the incidence of internal racial hostility. These factors can only create an adverse impact on combat readiness.

At the same time, the Slavic groups may be forced to accept increasing minority involvement in policy making. The minority soldier must ultimately be given greater responsibility. All available evidence suggests that the current Slavic leadership, as well as the Slavic peoples, will have great difficulty in accepting the changes. If they do not, the internal strife that will occur could mean degradation of military preparedness.

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15. Deeney, Dennis A., page 9.



Capt. Peter Goldberg holds a B.S. in Biology from Brooklyn College, CUNY, and an M.S. in Wildlife Science from Utah State University. After three years as a 97B, he was commissioned via ROTC. Goldberg has served as an air defense artillery AIT platoon leader, a Nike-Hercules battalion S-2, an image interpretation section leader and a counterintelligence section leader. He is currently assigned to the INSCOM Counterintelligence and Signal Security Support Battalion, Presidio of San Francisco.

Corrections

In the April-June 1982 issue of Military Intelligence, Mr. Barry Katz should have been listed with Dr. Stanley M. Ulanoff as a co-author of the feature article "American Business Uses MI Too."

The April-June cover photo was courtesy of the 82nd Airborne Division Public Affairs Office. The cover photo of the July-September issue was taken by SSgt. Carl Burnett of the Fort Huachuca Photo Lab.

The 97B dilemma

In recent years, severe personnel shortages have been experienced in the enlisted counterintelligence field (97B). To help remedy the situation, a concept known as the Counterintelligence Assistant 97B10 Program began in January 1981.

The 97B10 Program provides "off the street" recruitment into the 97B field. Following basic training, the recruit comes to USAICS for a 10 week course of instruction which emphasizes the tactical role of counterintelligence in operations security support. Upon successful completion of the course, the 97B10 graduate is qualified to be a counterintelligence assistant in a tactical unit, not a counterintelligence agent. As a CI assistant, the soldier is able to help experienced CI agents in their investigative and OPSEC support functions, but is not authorized to carry a badge and credentials nor conduct investigations on his own.

It was envisioned that the 97B10 would serve an internship of at least one year in a tactical OPSEC/CI assignment and, upon reaching 21 years of age and with the recommendation of his commander, return for follow-on training to qualify as a 97B20, CI agent.

The internship period would serve several purposes. First, it would provide additional personnel in the field to assist in CI support to OPSEC. Also, by pairing the 97B10 with an experienced CI agent, the 97B10 would continue his education process by learning from the experience of his partner. The internship period also would allow the field commander to evaluate the potential of the 97B10 for the CI field and recommend follow-on training.

The concept was sound and the soldiers recruited into the program were of high caliber and

motivation; however, the program has been plagued with problems since its inception. USAICS intends to attack the problems and, with proper management, make the program work as it was envisioned.

Unfortunately, the 97B10 Program was not implemented as envisioned. Positions in TDA and TOE organizations were not identified for 97B10 personnel. Several hundred were recruited, flooding the training base, but more seriously, also flooding the tactical units. Recruiters gave the wrong job descriptions to prospective recruits; that is, they gave them the 97B20 job description. The students (97B10) arrived at USAICS believing they were to be trained for investigative positions requiring the wearing of civilian clothes and carrying a badge and credentials. Confronted with the reality of a tactical assignment and a period of internship, many opted to renegotiate their contracts or to terminate their service on the basis of erroneous enlistments.

Those who opted to give the 97B10 Program and the Army a chance were trained by USAICS. Upon completion of their training,

they were assigned against 97B20/30/40 requirements because there were no 97B10 positions in any units. The result was a flood of 97B10 personnel into the tactical units. Very few experienced CI personnel were being assigned because their positions had been filled by 97B10 personnel. It was not unusual for a unit to find itself with many 97B10s and only two or three experienced agents. It was a "Catch-22" situation—the unit could not perform its CI investigative functions because it didn't have its complement of trained investigators; the unit could not pair its 97B10 personnel with experienced agents as it had none or almost none; and the unit could not requisition experienced agents because its requisitions had been filled with 97B10 personnel.

Because of the turmoil these actions and lack of actions caused, recruitment for the 97B10 Program was suspended in August 1981 by the U.S. Army Recruiting Command and is currently in a hold status. USAICS continued to train those 97B10 personnel in the pipeline and those erroneously recruited after August 1981. The suspension is to remain in effect until the problems can be worked out of the program and a decision is made

97B10 PERSONNEL TRAINED BY USAICS

CLASS	WHEN GRADUATED	NUMBER GRADUATED	TOTAL GRADUATED
81-97B10-1	Mar 81	8	8
81-97B10-2	May 81	43	51
81-97B10-3	Jun 81	21	72
81-97B10-4	Jul 81	22	94
81-97B10-5	Jul 81	41	135
81-97B10-6	Sep 81	42	177
81-97B10-7	Sep 81	30	207
81-97B10-8	Oct 81	46	253
82-97B10-501	Dec 81	24	277
82-97B10-1	Mar 82	32	309
82-97B10-2	May 82	32	341
82-97B10-3	May 82	19	360
82-97B10-6	Sep 82	38	398
82-97B10-9	(Dec 82)	(157)	(4137)

NOTE: Class 82-97B10-9 is currently in session with 15 students.

concerning subsequent 97B training. USAICS does not, therefore, anticipate training any additional personnel as 97B10s during Fiscal Year 1983.

USAICS is moving ahead to "fix" the 97B10 issue; this fix is a two-pronged approach. The first fix required is to ensure that all trained 97B10 personnel are afforded an opportunity to return to USAICS when they become eligible for transition training to the 97B20 level. USAICS is planning to conduct seven iterations of the transition course during FY 1983. Despite USAICS' efforts to obtain additional instructors required for this training, no resources have been provided. USAICS will need assistance from the field in terms of experienced agents to serve as assistant instructors. Approximately five assistant instructors, preferably senior NCOs, will be needed for 17 days of the course. Hopefully, units sending 97B10 personnel for transition training will also be able to provide some TDY assistant instructor support.

USAICS requires support from the field to make sure 97B10 personnel are properly prepared before coming back for transition training. A major problem in the first transition course (29 July-7 October 1982) was that many of the students simply could not write at the required standards. A major portion of the training is conducting interviews and preparing a typed agent report from that interview. The training presupposes that the student has a good basic understanding of the English language, including sentence structure, grammar and spelling. Unit commanders with 97B10 personnel who are weak in these areas should strongly recommend them to go to the local education center and brush up on these skills. The three-phase, programmed text series that USAICS uses is English 2200, English 3200 and English 3600, *A Programmed Course in*

PLANNED 97B10/20 TRANSITION TRAINING-FY 83

Class #	Capacity	Report Date	Close Date
83-97B20-1 (T)	30	22 Oct 82	16 Dec 82
83-97B20-2 (T)	30	4 Feb 83	1 Apr 83
83-97B20-3 (T)	30	4 Mar 83	28 Apr 83
83-97B20-4 (T)	30	1 Apr 83	26 May 83
83-97B20-5 (T)	30	20 May 83	18 Jul 83
83-97B20-6 (T)	30	8 Jul 83	1 Sep 83
83-97B20-7 (T)	30	23 Sep 83	21 Nov 83

Grammar and Usage, by Joseph C. Blumenthal, published by Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc. Each of the three phases has diagnostic tests which determine whether a student needs the programmed text and identifies his weaknesses. If a student can pass the English 3600 diagnostic test, he should have no problem with writing skills during the course.

The 97B10 who has not been doing any typing as part of his duties would be wise to also brush up on his typing skills before returning for transition training. The better he can type, the less time he will spend on each report.

The first challenge in the 97B10 issue—that of providing sufficient training seats for transition training—is well in hand. The second challenge is what to do with the program. USAICS is examining a number of options. One of these options is to just do away with the program; not a very imaginative solution, but it does eliminate the problems. Another proposal is to replace the 97B10 with a 97X, a proposed new MOS that would support and serve as a pool for the 97B and 97C. This is strongly reminiscent of the former 97D Program. Some have suggested that the off the street recruiting be continued, but that the recruits go through full 97B20 training. This

would eliminate the need for additional training and would allow local commanders to request badges and credentials for individuals who have proven themselves. Another solution is to continue the program, but to more carefully control the number of personnel recruited into the program. This would require units to identify those positions which a 97B10 could fill.

USAICS will be reviewing each of these proposals and any other proposals that may surface. Comments from the field are strongly urged to help resolve the 97B10 issue once and for all.

Coordination of student quotas for transitional training can be made through HQDA, MILPERCEN (DAPC-EPL-M), ATTN: MSgt. Young, Autovon 221-9363/4/5.

There are several interpretations of the various translations of the Russian word "razvedka." This article, however, deals with reconnaissance—specifically, efforts to collect information about strength, disposition, composition, combat readiness, activities and apparent intentions of the enemy and information on the area of operations.

The Opposing Forces front and its subordinate elements have a variety of collection means. OPFOR portrayal is incomplete without exercise play which indicates the aggressive employment of these assets.

Aerial Reconnaissance

Three aerial reconnaissance regiments subordinate to the Tactical Air Army are controlled by front headquarters, although specific requests for reconnaissance are initiated by armies and divisions. OPFOR aerial reconnaissance missions flown, or notionally portrayed, should be low-altitude, tactical missions, conducted by flights of two aircraft. Such missions may extend to a depth of 600 kilometers behind the Blue Force forward line of troops. Portrayal of aerial reconnaissance should also include the use of helicopters and drones.

Approximately one-half of all tactical reconnaissance missions should be portrayed as data-linked to ground stations. Reporting capabilities should include:

- Visual: real-time and near-real-time.
- Photo: strip and frame.
- Signals Intelligence: near-real-time.
- Battlefield television: real-time and near-real-time.
- Drones: real-time.
- Infrared: near-real-time.
- SLAR: near-real-time.
- Satellite: photo, IR, radar and ELINT.

Radio and Radar Intercept

Radio/radar intercept units provide near-real-time targeting

Portraying OPFOR Reconnaissance

by locating Blue Force C³ centers, radar sites, nuclear delivery systems and other targets. OPFOR radio/radar intercept capability *must* be portrayed (at least notionally) in all CPX/FTX scenarios. Depending upon the exercise situation and the training objectives, intercept activities may result in jamming, artillery fires or continued monitoring.

Artillery Target Acquisition

Target acquisition is a cornerstone of the OPFOR artillery fire plan. The following acquisition methods are used to obtain targets:

- Observation: Direct visual surveillance of the Blue Force from observation posts or by air or ground reconnaissance elements.
- Radar surveillance: The use of acquisition radars to locate Blue Force artillery units by spotting shells in flight and determining their point of origin.
- Sound ranging: The use of sound ranging stations situated two to four kilometers behind the FLOT, and approximately one to one and one-half kilometers apart to determine Blue Force artillery locations.
- Flash ranging: The use of a reconnaissance theodolite and other optical equipment to locate Blue Force artillery from firing flashes. When not in contact, three observation posts are established along a baseline of approximately 1,000 meters, one to four kilometers forward of the FLOT.

□ Radar direction finding: Using intercept/DF equipment to detect electronic emissions. Bearings are plotted from two or three points to locate emitters.

Long-range Reconnaissance


Long-range reconnaissance is conducted by special operations companies at front and army levels, by the OPFOR division's organic reconnaissance battalion and by airborne troops. Reconnaissance teams of five to 10 people will operate throughout the Blue Force rear area. Team members will be dressed in civilian attire, OPFOR camouflage uniforms or Blue Force uniforms, and normally will be inserted by means of night drops from fixed wing aircraft. These teams still use short-burst HF radio transmissions for reporting. Teams from front and army levels may penetrate up to 350 kilometers behind the Blue Force FLOT. Division elements may be employed up to 100 kilometers deep.

Chemical Reconnaissance

Specialized chemical reconnaissance assets are located at division level and above. Their missions are primarily defensive; locating and marking contaminated areas, monitoring chemical and biological agents, reporting contamination boundaries and safe routes, and identifying potential NBC targets. The BRDM/RKH is most appropriate as a "signature item of equipment" for a chemical reconnaissance unit.

Engineer Reconnaissance

Engineer units conduct reconnaissance to determine the trafficability of the terrain, the location of obstacles, the availability of suitable river crossing sites and the locations of usable march routes. Engineer specialists normally accompany troop reconnaissance patrols from divisional elements.



These organizations depict specialized reconnaissance elements at each command echelon.

Officers' Reconnaissance

The commander and his staff may conduct a reconnaissance of the battle area to locate strong-points and alternate defensive positions, flanks and boundaries, routes of advance, and routes to be used by second echelon forces.

This reconnaissance is conducted from high ground or by helicopter and is not an attempt to penetrate Blue Force controlled area

Reconnaissance Groups

Reconnaissance groups are temporary, task-organized units, tailored for specific situations and missions, and formed from reconnaissance elements and/or

maneuver elements. Such groups can be portrayed as:

- ☐ Reconnoitering routes of advance, crossing sites and obstacles.
- ☐ Leading pursuit forces.
- ☐ Probing Blue Force defenses.
- ☐ Screening flanks and boundaries.
- ☐ Conducting raids and ambushes.
- ☐ Attempting to locate Blue Force headquarters, artillery, maneuver elements and routes of advance or withdrawal.

The size of a reconnaissance group depends upon its mission, and can vary from one vehicle

patrols to reinforced company-sized units. OPFOR reconnaissance groups (unless conducting a raid or ambush) stress collection of information, *not* combat, and will attempt to remain unobserved while advancing rapidly. If contact is made with the Blue Force, patrols will report the contact, attempt to break contact and continue to advance.

Tactical March

Reconnaissance groups from the OPFOR division's reconnaissance battalion provide a screen up to 50 kilometers forward of the advance guard. These platoon- or company-size groups reconnoiter the routes to be used by the division.

A platoon (deployed as two or three groups) from the regimental reconnaissance company will move eight to 10 kilometers ahead of the advance guard. The remainder of the reconnaissance company provides a screen to the front and flanks of the regimental main body.

Meeting Engagement

When the leading reconnaissance groups encounter the Blue Force, they deploy to the flanks and continue to observe and report. They will attempt to determine Blue Force strength, movement and locations of artillery and reserves.

Immediately after the Blue Force is encountered, the advance guard sends out its forward security element and a combat reconnaissance patrol. Although these forces attempt to avoid becoming decisively engaged, they may be portrayed as probing the Blue Force to locate weak points. As the advance guards and the OPFOR main body continue to advance, reconnaissance elements may attempt to locate routes which can be used to bypass the Blue Force.

Attacking a Defending Blue Force

If the OPFOR is portrayed as

conducting an attack against a prepared linear defense, the division's reconnaissance battalion will be located behind the division's first echelon until a gap is created in the Blue Force defenses. Once a gap is created, reconnaissance groups precede the division's second echelon/exploitation force through the gap to locate Blue Force second echelon forces, reserves, command posts and artillery, and to ensure that designated routes of advance are clear.

When the OPFOR attacks a "cellular" defense consisting of an array of strongpoints, the division's reconnaissance groups may be portrayed as bypassing Blue Force defenses and continuing toward the Blue Force rear area while the division continues its attack.

Pursuit

Aggressive, reliable reconnaissance is essential to the success of pursuit operations. During a pursuit, reconnaissance groups deploy forward of the pursuing force along the axis of advance, to the flanks of the withdrawing Blue Force, and to the front of the withdrawing force when possible.

Primary reconnaissance missions are locating Blue Force units deployed in defensive positions or moving forward and locating routes which may be used for flanking or enveloping attacks. A major concern is preventing the pursuing OPFOR from being surprised.

Deliberate Defense

If a security zone is established

as part of a large scale defense, reconnaissance elements from the front and army levels may be portrayed as operating up to 100 kilometers forward of the main defenses. Reconnaissance groups from first echelon divisions will deploy up to 25 kilometers forward; and regimental reconnaissance groups up to 10 kilometers forward.

Reconnaissance groups deployed within and forward of the security zone report on Blue Force strength, composition, disposition and probable axes of advance. As the Blue Force advances, most OPFOR reconnaissance groups will withdraw, avoiding contact, and continually report to their parent units. Once the reconnaissance groups have withdrawn from the security zone, they are used to screen lateral and rear boundaries.

Some elements from front and army levels may be portrayed as "stay-behind" forces. Once they have been passed by the Blue Force, they continue to conduct reconnaissance activities in the Blue Force rear area. They also may conduct sabotage and harassment operations.

Hasty Defense

If the OPFOR is required to assume a hasty defense during the course of offensive operations, most reconnaissance groups will conduct screening operations to the flanks and rear of the defensive positions. Where the situation permits, some reconnaissance elements will continue to move forward,

attempting to locate Blue Force units and routes which can be used to bypass the Blue Force or to conduct flanking or enveloping attacks.

To be realistic, training exercises must incorporate accurate portrayal of a credible opponent. In the case of the Soviet-based OPFOR, this means reconnaissance activities must be portrayed as continuous and aggressive. It is not enough, however, to merely mention reconnaissance units in message traffic. The results of successful reconnaissance efforts must be incorporated into the exercise. Being required to deal with the results—jamming, air strikes, artillery strikes, surprise attacks, etc.—may not make the exercise any easier, but it will make it a better test of the unit's combat skills.



OPFOR training tip

If your unit is going to the National Training Center (or even if it isn't), you might consider encouraging the use of "alternative" methods of communication as part of your home-station training. When you get to Fort Irwin, you might find that being accustomed to using messengers, flags, pyrotechnics and even, dare we say, wire, might make your visit a little less traumatic.

You might also try to find a place in your unit's training for the word "authenticate."



Viewpoint - Continued from page 3

form unconventional warfare sabotage missions to a depth of 100 kilometers.

Soviet unconventional warfare units receive intensive training. Small groups of men are trained as teams. Each team has an

officer in charge who is fluent in the language of the target country, and a senior sergeant is second in command. Other members of the groups are trained as radio operators, weapons and demolition experts. In addition to normal military train-

ing, the following skills are emphasized:

- tactics of infiltrating and exfiltrating the target area
- night operational linkups
- sabotage methods
- parachute training
- clandestine communications

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Specialty Proponency Advocate

E-9 promotion board analyzed

Proponency

USAICS has received an analysis of the 1983 E-9 promotion board findings for career management fields 96, 98 and 33. Although the following items are specifically applicable to the highest enlisted ranks, all career-minded military intelligence soldiers should carefully note the items deemed important by members of DA level promotion boards.

In determining whether individuals under consideration were qualified for promotion, the board members had to satisfy themselves that the individuals were fully qualified professionally, had demonstrated integrity and were capable of performing duties expected in the next higher grade. The board used the "whole person" concept in their approach to determining recommendations for promotion. All available information contained in 201 files was checked. Isolated examples of excellence or mediocrity were not used as a determinant for selection or rejection.

In general, MI records reflected high quality soldiers who were competitive when compared to soldiers in other career management fields. However, the board did find it difficult

to translate past accomplishments, often technical in nature, into indicators of administration, organization and troop leadership potential. The board had to decide which of the eligible candidates would serve the Army better; those who had demonstrated technical expertise or those whose qualities were derived from technical experience but were oriented toward positions of leadership.

Physical fitness was stressed and involved more than just comparing height to weight. Many MI soldiers were involved in active physical fitness programs, not just those who were overweight. In the few cases involving overweight soldiers, raters and indorsers usually cut one point in the numeral columns of senior enlisted evaluation reports, but seldom commented in the narrative sections. The board also reviewed documents for current physical examination data. In some cases this data was not current. The board also questioned the accuracy of unverified statements/certificates of weight and height submitted by the soldiers themselves. Sometimes these certificates conflicted with photos or other

data which indicated overweight conditions.

The written evaluations on evaluation reports were judged as major reflections of performance, yet most records revealed very little effort to identify average or substandard performers. At the E-8 and E-9 grades, if all individuals appear to be high level performers, challenges to performance may not be valid.

Overall, many files indicated no secondary MOS, many official photographs were not up to date and several files had no photographs at all.

Based on these findings, it is clear that DA boards place emphasis on accurate, well-thought-out narratives contained in evaluation reports and other documentation. If possible, DA boards cross-reference to other existing documents. If cross-referencing results in conflicting data, negative assessments naturally occur. We must continue to concentrate on insuring only well described, accurate and current data is contained in official 201 files. It is the individual NCO's responsibility to keep his 201 file as complete and current as possible.

- hand-to-hand combat and silent killing techniques
- language/customs of target country
- survival behind enemy lines
- identification and location of targets

To make training as realistic as possible, Soviet training centers are equipped with realistic models of key targets such as enemy facilities and weapon systems.

Soviet writings point out the effectiveness of unconventional warfare units and record the accomplishments in World War II:

"During the war the partisans killed, wounded or took prisoner

hundreds of thousands of German troops, collaborators and officials of the occupation administration. They derailed more than 18,000 trains, and destroyed or damaged thousands of locomotives and tens of thousands of railway cars and cisterns. The partisan war affected the morale of the German army, keeping the German troops in a constant state of fear."

The Soviets also have used unconventional forces and methods since the war:

- Special purpose troops were used to crush resistance to

Soviet domination in Eastern Europe.

- Soviet special purpose forces were used in the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 to arrest Czech leadership and secure key objectives in Prague.
- Soviet special purpose forces played an important role in the invasion of Afghanistan and the elimination of President Amin.

Unconventional warfare is a basic element on Soviet doctrine, and Soviet capabilities constitute a formidable threat.

USAICS Notes

Meyer named top TRADOC NCO

SFC John M. Meyer, a platoon sergeant for Delta Company, 2nd Battalion, USAICS, is the TRADOC Installation NCO of the Year. The 33-year-old career soldier was selected from a field of 14 NCOs.

Meyer hails from Sierra Vista, Ariz., and has served in the Army for 14 years. He came to Fort Huachuca from an assignment with the 3rd Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group, Fort Gulick, Panama.


Meyer's platoon is the MI NCO Advanced Course, comprised of 35 to 40 NCOs, mostly E-6s and E-7s. Meyer says he must earn their respect by exhibiting professional leadership traits. He considers his job "challenging and rewarding" and hopes that his selection as TRADOC NCO of the Year will help him toward his goal of making sergeant major. Meyer received a set of dress blues and a nine day trip to Hawaii for himself and his wife.



SFC John M. Meyer, TRADOC NCO of the Year, talks with a USAICS student. Meyer is a platoon sergeant for Company D, 2nd Battalion, USAICS. (Photo by Bob Kerr)

USAICS Instructors of the Month named

The Instructor of the Month for May was Australian Capt. Robert A. Lacey from the Department of Surveillance System Maintenance. Lacey arrived at Fort Huachuca in January 1981 and has been teaching a wide variety of courses for the Officers' Basic and Advanced Courses. His previous overseas assignments have been in Vietnam in 1967 and 1968 and in Singapore in 1970 and 1972. This is Lacey's first assignment in the U.S. His honors include the Vietnam Medal, the National Medal from Australia, and the Vietnam Campaign Medal. Lacey is currently working on a Baccalaureate Degree in Business Administration.



The Instructor of the Month for June was SSgt. Michael Parker from the Department of Surveillance and Systems Management. Parker, a native of Michigan, has over 10 years of service in the U.S. Army. He arrived at Fort Huachuca in January 1981 from an assignment with the 187th ATC Company at Finthen, Germany. Parker was graduated from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical Uni-

versity, Summa Cum Laude, with a degree in Professional Aeronautics and is currently working towards a Master's Degree in Public Administration from Golden Gate University. Some courses that Parker teaches are blocks of instruction on Troubleshooting Multivibrators and Special Purpose Devices, Logic Notation and Troubleshooting Logic Circuits. Awards that Parker has earned include the Army Commendation Medal and the Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal.




The Instructor of the Month for July was SFC Richard A. Henson. A native of New Hampshire, Henson instructs courses in Signal Security for the Department of Human Intelligence. Henson has been in the Army for 17 years and came to Fort Huachuca in July 1981. His previous assignments were as a technical writer at Fort Devens and as operations sergeant with the 201st ASA Company, Augsburg, Germany. He is currently pursuing a degree in Education and hopes to become a technical writer or teacher upon retirement. His awards and honors include the Meritorious Service Medal with two oak leaf clusters, the Army Commendation Medal and the Army Achievement Medal.

October-December 1982



The Instructor of the Month for September was SSgt. Michael A. Vincent from the Department of Human Intelligence, Exploitation Division, where he teaches courses on Soviet Weapons and Equipment, Soviet Armed Forces, Soviet Tactics and Human Intelligence Psychology. Vincent holds a BS in Psychology from the University of Maryland and is currently pursuing a Master's Degree in Management from the University of Phoenix. A native of Ishpeming, Mich., Vincent came to Fort Huachuca from an assignment with the 18th MI Battalion in Munich, Germany. During his nine years with the Army, he has been awarded the Meritorious Service Medal and the Army Commendation Medal.

The Instructor of the Month for August was SSgt. Stephen J. Phillips. Phillips, an instructor for the Department of Surveillance System Maintenance, Ground Surveillance Division, teaches the Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman course. He arrived at Fort Huachuca in October 1981 from an assignment with the 2nd Armored Division (Forward) at Lucius D. Clay Kaserne, Germany. Phillips has been in the Army for nine years and hopes to pursue a career in electronics technology after retirement.



USAISD Notes

Wetzel wins Fort Devens NCO of the Year Award

Sgt. Thomas P. Wetzel, Staff and Faculty Company, 2nd Battalion, USAISD, has been selected as Fort Devens NCO of the Year. Wetzel was accorded this honor July 21 after completing a grueling two-day board which pitted him against other Fort Devens NCO of the Quarter winners.

During the first day of competition, Wetzel and the others were questioned on such varied subjects as military justice, awareness of military programs, map reading, NBC and first aid. The most challenging and demanding part of the board was the practical exercise conducted on the second day. The NCOs were required to inspect a squad of soldiers, lead them in dismounted drill, inspect a barracks room and latrine, correctly identify and explain the proper wear of ribbons, and properly fold and present the national colors. The second day's competition ended with each NCO presenting a five-minute lecture on a subject of his choice.

As Fort Devens NCO of the Quarter and the Year, Wetzel was presented two Army Commendation Medals, a plaque and a cho-

ice of an all-expense paid trip to Hawaii or a \$1,500 savings bond. Wetzel opted for the bond.

USAISD Logo Contest winner announced

Pvt. William Connell of the USAISD Pensacola Detachment won the USAISD Logo Contest conducted last spring.

The contest was held to obtain a logo and slogan representative of USAISD, its Goodfellow and Pensacola Detachments, and USAICS at Fort Huachuca.

Connell's winning idea, "Divided by Distance, United in Mission," won him a "Star" letter from Brig. Gen. Richard W. Wilmot, former USAICS commander, and a \$50 savings bond from USAISD.

Young named Pensacola NCO of the Year

MSgt. Robert Young was recently selected as the first Pensacola NCO of the Year.

Young, a senior platoon sergeant, was presented the award at the Pensacola Army Ball by Brig. Gen. Richard W. Wilmot, former USAICS commander.

The Cryptocorner

Continued from page 18

**CONTINUING ONCE
MORE THIS TIME
WITH CRYPTOGRAMS
OFTEN SUBLIME.
OUR POETIC CIPHERS
FOR NEW GUYS AND
LIFERS
ARE NOT VERY GREAT,
BUT THEY RHYME.**

Cipher alphabet—
ABCDEFGHIJKLMN OPQRSTUVWXYZ
SPHINXABCDEFGHIJKLMOQRTUVWYZ

**FIRST POEM EASY,
SECOND ONE TOUGH.
WRACK YOUR BRAINS
IF YOU HAVE ENOUGH.**

Cipher alphabet—
SPHINXABCDEFGHIJKLMOQRTUVWYZ
ZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA

Analysis Training Project

Several projects are underway to develop new training circulars and classroom materials for teaching analytical thinking for all-source tactical intelligence analysis.

The effort is part of a three year project sponsored by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and the U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. The developed products are to support USAICS training materials through the inclusion of a human information processing perspective of intelligence analysis. Another objective of the project is to evaluate existing automated intelligence support systems to identify available procedures and tools that could be incorporated into the USAICS training program to teach thinking skills.

Upcoming MI Magazine articles will outline the development and major areas of this research effort. Areas of interest include: the basic research study which resulted in the development of a descriptive model of the thinking processes of intelligence analysis, the dependency of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield on human subjective judgment and computerized thinking aids for evaluating enemy courses of action, updating the intelligence estimate and collection planning. The first of this series of articles will appear in the January-March 1983 issue of MI Magazine.



Officer Notes

Applying for advanced civil schooling

Each year Military Intelligence Branch selects officers to attend advanced civil schooling under various programs. The Army provides these officers with an educational opportunity and assigns them to positions calling for that education periodically throughout their careers.

The Army has two general categories of programs, fully-funded and partially-funded. Under the fully-funded program the Army provides a permanent change of station move, full pay and allowance, tuition; and up to \$200 per year for textbooks and supplies. Under the partially-funded program officers must pay for their own tuition, textbooks and supplies.

Officer quotas for the fully-funded programs are determined by specialty codes and positions validated by the Army Education Requirements Board. Quotas are no longer based on shortage disciplines. The current policy is that selectees must obtain a degree in an academic discipline which supports one or both of their specialties.

The majority of officers with advanced degrees obtain them either on their own or through a partially-funded program. Officers selected for the degree completion program will attend school by a PCS move or through permissive TDY at no expense to the government. Applicants who will be able to complete degree requirements in the least amount of time will be selected first.

Officers in the fully-funded or degree completion programs at

the graduate level must serve in a validated utilization position for three years to apply the education. Graduates who serve an initial utilization tour will be re-utilized on a periodic schedule, consistent with Army requirements and officer professional development needs.

Officers must meet the following prerequisites:

- Normally have no less than seven and no more than 13 years of commissioned service.
- Be fully qualified in the initial specialty at the tactical and nontactical levels.
- Have MI officer advanced course credit.
- Possess a top-level military performance record.
- Have a good undergraduate degree record.
- Send a complete application with supporting documentation to MI Branch.
- Be available for a PCS move at the requested school start date.

Officers must apply for graduate school under the provisions of AR 621-1. Officers are selected by MI Branch through an informal board composed of branch members. Advanced civil schools boards will be held in September and April of each year.

Students participating in fully-funded programs are required to obtain a degree which supports one of their two specialties. The following, although not all inclusive, is a list of academic disciplines which support MI specialties.

35 Military Intelligence
Command, Control and
Communications
EW Systems Technology
Area Studies
International Relations

Foreign Affairs
Civil Government
Geopolitics
Political Science
36 CI/HUMINT/SIGSEC
Foreign Language
Literature

Electronic Engineering
Electrical Engineering
Area Studies
International Relations
Foreign Affairs
Civil Government
Geopolitics

37 EW CRYPTOLOGY
Command, Control and
Communications
EW Systems Technology
Electrical Engineering
Radio Engineering
ADPS Engineering
Math Cryptanalysis

For more information contact
Maj. David K. Androff, Professional Development Officer, MI Branch, by writing MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPF-M, 200 Stovall St., Alexandria, Va. 22332, or calling Autovon 220-0144, commercial (202) 325-0144.

Unit histories, crests wanted

The USAICS School Brigade command sergeant major is gathering unit histories and crests for display in the school barracks and office hallways. He requests that each military intelligence unit send a diagram of their distinctive unit insignia with a description and brief unit history, including what the unit mission is right now. The information will be displayed in hallways and other places students gather, to help provide the students with information about the units they may be assigned to. Photographs of units members at work, in garrison or in the field, would also be appreciated.

Please send all information to Commander, USAICS, ATTN: ATSI-TP-CSM, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613.

Enlisted Notes

Primary Technical Course now offered for 96D

USAICS is now offering a five week course which focuses on training critical tasks for skill level II enlisted soldiers. To be eligible to attend Primary Technical Course, soldiers awarded MOS 96D (Image Interpreter) must be grade E-4, on promotion list to grade E-5, or be grade E-5 or below performing in an E-5 position.

Soldiers may attend either temporary duty enroute to a new duty assignment or TDY and return. The soldier's organization must fund the TDY and return. TDY attendance at PTC and subsequent return to an overseas unit is authorized provided the soldier has a minimum of six months remaining in the command following course completion.

Interested soldiers should submit DA Form 4187 (Personnel

Action Request) through channels to DA MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPL-M, Alexandria, Va. 22331. A current copy of DA Forms 2 and 2-1 must be attached to each application. Selection will be based on a first come - first serve basis.

The Fiscal Year 1983 schedule for PTC course number 242-96D20, is as follows:

CLASS NUMBER	PERIOD
01-83	1 Oct 82 - 19 Nov 82
02-83	7 Jan 83 - 17 Feb 83
03-83	18 Feb 83 - 31 Mar 83
04-83	CANCELLED
05-83	1 Apr 83 - 12 May 83
06-83	13 May 83 - 23 Jun 83
07-83	CANCELLED
08-83	8 Jul 83 - 18 Aug 83
09-83	19 Aug 83 - 29 Sep 83
10-83	CANCELLED

Point of contact at MILPERCEN is SSgt.(P) Roby, AUTOVON 221-0415/6430, Commercial (202) 325-0415/6430.

Enlisted Preference Statement important tool for MILPERCEN

One of the most important forms MILPERCEN uses to determine future assignments for enlisted personnel is the Enlisted Preference Statement, DA Form 2635. This form should be completed whenever there are significant changes in a soldier's career, (i.e., grade changes, PMOS reclassification, PCS, etc.). Para 1-8, AR 614-200, describes when

submission of a new, 2635 is required. All personnel in CMF 33, 95 (E-6 and above) 96 and 98 are required to have an updated DA Form 2635 on record at MILPERCEN at all times.

Instructions for completing the Enlisted Preference Statement are included on the back of the form. Local personnel offices can assist soldiers in the preparation of the Preference Statement, but here are a few tips for filling out the form.

All items should be filled out completely on the form. Linguists should ensure language is included in the PMOS/ASI block.

The block on Military School

Preference is a chance to list all military schools soldiers would like to attend that are not DA selected schools.

If an intertheater or intra-theater transfer (ITT) is desired upon completion of a present overseas tour, ensure that block 16 is filled out properly. Only indicate the areas desired in block 16. Use the remarks section (block 25) to indicate a preference for any particular unit.

Block 25 (remarks), may also be used to express any statements service members feel could effect future assignments. It is especially important for personnel with Army spouse's to include their spouse's name, grade, SSN, PMOS, last PCS and current unit of assignment in this block. The remarks section is an opportunity to tell MILPERCEN personnel any information soldiers feel is important. There are no restrictions on what may be included in this block.

When the Enlisted Preference Statement is completed, it is turned in at the local personnel office. They will update records and forward it to MILPERCEN.

The Enlisted Preference Statement is one of the few tools MILPERCEN has available to indicate where a soldier would like to be assigned and what schools he would like to attend. While the areas listed on the Preference Statement may not be available at the time this form is examined, every time an assignment is made MILPERCEN career branches make a genuine attempt to give soldiers what they want within the constraints of Army assignment policies.

Preventing misuse of trained soldiers

Almost daily, the Professional Development NCOs at MP/MI

Branch, MILPERCEN, hear from soldiers who have been assigned to positions much different from the ones they have been trained to fill. Stories of MI MOS-holding soldiers being used as unit mail clerks, training NCOs or administrative clerks are not uncommon. Most of these soldiers want to know what they can do to be reassigned to a unit that can use their training, experience and potential in intelligence.

First of all, soldiers can be assured that they are assigned to an installation or activity based on a valid requirement for their grade, primary MOS, and, in many cases, additional skill identifier and language. Secondly, paragraph 7-11, AR 614-200, specifically prohibits use outside of an MOS within the MI Career Management Fields 33, 96, and 98. This means a commander should not assign a MI soldier for primary duty as the unit personnel sergeant, unit supply sergeant, or lifeguard (actual case),

without prior approval by MILPERCEN. However, based on unit mission requirements, the commander may properly assign soldiers to perform these functions as additional duties. It would be great to perform only MOS related duties, but each commander has a mission to complete which may require the performance of some duties outside a soldier's primary MOS.

The Professional Development NCOs at MILPERCEN attempt to ensure proper use of soldiers by closely monitoring Senior Enlisted Evaluation Reports. If a soldier's duty MOS is not his primary MOS, or the job description on the SEER does not indicate duties related to the soldier's primary MOS, ASI, or language, a letter is usually sent to the commander requesting assignment to such a position. He has 45 days to make the proper adjustment to such a position. This is the primary means MILPERCEN has to try to ensure proper use of trained

soldiers. A certified copy of a DA Form 2 and DA Form 2-1 from the local MILPO to MILPERCEN reflecting use in another MOS is also sufficient. Critical shortages in almost all intelligence MOSs coupled with long and expensive technical training makes it imperative that all Military Intelligence soldiers be used properly.

Everyone can help professional development and career managers ensure proper use of soldiers in CMF 33, 96, and 98 by documenting cases of malutilization. Telephone calls and letters aren't enough.

The Proponency Office at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Az., is in the process of "scrubbing" all unit TDA's/TOE's to identify and eliminate nonessential intelligence positions. This will ensure that soldiers with intelligence skills are assigned where they can do the most good for the Army.

Feedback

'Officer' misuse?

Dear Editor,

I have noticed with disturbing frequency, especially on the part of the younger commissioned officer, the misuse of the word "officer." I have seen this misuse in many publications as well; to include messages transcending all echelons of command throughout the Army and including MI Magazine.

I would like to offer the following food for thought:

The officer corps of the Army consists of three types of officers:

- a. Commissioned
- b. Warrant
- c. Noncommissioned

Everytime I see or hear "officers and warrant officers," it gives me a feeling of confusion and raises the questions: Are the noncommissioned officers excluded/disregarded or are warrant officers the ones who are exclusive? Why can't we be more explicit when referring to a particular type of officer?

General usage or acceptance of a term does not make it correct. In these times of awareness, it is essential that we address correctly that which we wish to be clear.

In my (almost) 27 years of association with the greatest army in the world, the U.S. Army, I have made these distinctions:

a. Commissioned officer: The ultimate leader who, by virtue of the commission tendered into the officer corps, is responsible to utilize the TOTAL resources (human and materials) at his/her disposal to fulfill/accomplish the TOTAL MISSION.

b. Warrant officer: The technician in a given field who, by virtue of the warrant appointment into the officer corps, is responsible to provide guidance and technical expertise to carry out his/her portion in support of the TOTAL MISSION.

c. Noncommissioned officer: The first line supervisor who, by virtue of proven ability, has been promoted to a non-commissioned officer status within the officer corps and is therefore the executor of the tasks that lead to the accomplishment of the TOTAL MISSION.

As I see it, each type of officer described above has his/her own unique place within the Army structure; and the mere fact that the commissioning, appointment or promotion processes are different, makes none of them any less an officer.

So, when referring to "officers," it should be perfectly clear whether we are talking about the commissioned, warrant or noncommissioned officer.

In closing, I'd like to make an additional, but very relevant comment: We must not forget the junior enlisted personnel—THEY ARE OUR MOST IMPORTANT ASSETS—without them as the "DOERS," the tasks cannot be executed by the non-commissioned officer, the guidance and expertise from the technicians is unnecessary, and the ultimate leader is useless as well since the Army would cease to exist.

CWO 4 Fernando Garcia
Interrogation Technician
USAICS

Superintendent of Documents
U.S. Government Printing Office
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MILITARY INTELLIGENCE.

OCT 1982

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Next Issue:

Reserve Component CEWI-Dead or Alive
C³I=CEWI (A Combat Arms Officer's
Perspective)
CEWI Support to the Division Staff
From here to there with CEWI

